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ACTION: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETING
THEORIES OF EQUALITY AND WEBER
ROBERT BELTONt
Since Title VIZ of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 waspassed to pro-
scribe discrimination in employment, the courts have had to determine
the proper scope and application of the Act. This inquiry has gained
more crucial signflcance in the past decade as courts, amid cries of
"reverse discrimination" by disadvantaged white employees, have had
to judge the validity under Title VII ofrace-conscious affirmative action
plans, plans that use minority status as afactor in, employment deci-
sions. The United States Supreme Court has made their task more dif-
ficult by reading into the Act two competing theories of equality. One
theory, disparate impact, supports the use of affirmative action pro-
grams to increase minority representation in the workforce. The other
theory, disparate treatment, precludes the use of race in an employer's
decisionmakingprocess and thus supports claims of reverse discrimina-
tion. In this Article Professor Belton first traces the development of
these two competing and conflicting theories of equality. He then ana-
lyzes the Court's decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber, a decision
in which the Court againfaced the problem of the validity of affirmative
action programs. Professor Belton believes that the Court in Weber
has at last adopted a rationale that will allowfor an accommodation
between the two views of equality and/or the use of race-conscious af-
firmative action plans in appropriate circumstances. Professor Belton
lauds this result, believing that affirmative action is necessary to over-
come the effects of prior discrimination and assure that individuals
whose lives have been marked by discrimination will not be forever
barredfrom equal access to and opportunity in the job market.
I. INTRODUCTION
Brian Weber, a white laboratory technician at a Kaiser Aluminum plant
in Gramercy, Louisiana, succeeded Allan Bakke as the central character in
perhaps the most controversial and vigorously debated issue facing the
Supreme Court and the nation in recent years: May affirmative action pro-
grams, consistent with either constitutional or statutory provisions, include
race-conscious quotas designed to remedy specftc and societal discrimination?
The United States Supreme Court, after many years of refusing to consider the
issue, l faced it squarely in Regents of University of California v. Bakke.2 At
t Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. B.A. 1961, University of Connecti-
cut; J.D. 1965, Boston University School of Law. I express my appreciation to Waverly D. Cren-
shaw for his research assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of
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issue in Bakke was the validity of a medical school's voluntary affirmative
action plan that reserved sixteen seats out of an entering class of one hundred
for minority and disadvantaged students. Four Justices, relying solely on stat-
utory grounds, held that the plan violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
19643 because of its explicit use of racial quotas.4 A majority of the Court,
however, held that neither Title VI nor the fourteenth amendment prohibits
the specific use of race as one of several factors in academic admissions deci-
sions.5 Because of the sharply divided votes, Bakke did little to settle the
question of the legality of race-conscious affirmative action beyond deciding
the fate of Allan Bakke and the admissions program at the medical school. It
provided even less help with employment discrimination cases brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 which, like Title VI, is part of the
Civil Rights Act passed by Congress in 1964.
7
Almost one year after Bakke, the Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers
v. Weber,8 considered the legality under Title VII of a voluntary race-con-
scious affirmative action program adopted by a union and a private employer
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); United States v. International
Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Act provides: "No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied of the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id § 2000d.
4. 438 U.S. at 271. Justice Stevens, writing for Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist, adopted the plain-meaning canon of statutory construction to interpret Title VI
and thus found it unnecessary to reach the issue of the constitutionality of the use of race-con-
scions quotas. 438 U.S. at 408-21.
5. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun, reached the constitu-
tional question. 438 U.S. at 324-79. Justice Powelrs vote was pivotal to the result reached in the
case. He also reached the constitutional question, but on different grounds from Justice Brennan.
Id at 269-320.
Justice Powell attempted to lay to rest the semantic squabble over whether the legitimacy of
race-conscious remedies turn on whether they were designated "goals and timetables" or "quo-
tas." 438 U.S. at 288-89.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 111978). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 provides a limited opportunity to redress employment discrimination. The broad prohibi-
tion against discrimination on the ground of race, color or national origin "under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance" is qualified as to employment discrimination under
§ 2000d-3, which states, "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize
action under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any employment prac-
tice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where the primary objec-
tive of the federal financial assistance is to provide employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976).
Thus, Title VI does not provide a judicial remedy for employment discrimination by employers
receiving federal funds unless providing employment is a primary objective of the federal aid or
discrimination in employment necessarily causes discrimination against the primary beneficiaries
of the federal aid. See Trageser v. Libbie Rehab. Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 88-89 (4th Cir. 1978);
Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 980 (E.D. Mich. 1979); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(c)(3) (1975)
(dealing with the relationship between 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-(3)).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
8. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). After the highly publicized decision in Bakke, some pronouncement
from the Court on the legality of quotas in employment discrimination was expected in County of
Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979). The Court had agreed to review two questions in
Davis: (1) whether the use of employment policies that were exclusionary in operation, but not
purposefully discriminatory, violated the Civil Rights Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), and
(2) whether the imposition of minimum hiring quotas for "fully qualified minority applicants"
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without a prior judicial finding of past racial discrimination. The Court, by a
five-to-two vote, held that Title VII does not prohibit all privately adopted
race-conscious affirmative action designed to eliminate a manifest racial im-
balance in traditionally segregated job categories. Although the full implica-
tions of Weber remain to be developed, it is a basic thesis of this Article that
Weber, unlike Bakke, provides a framework for establishing a balanced solu-
tion to a difficult conceptual problem-the meaning of equality-and helps to
define the potential contours of race-conscious affirmative action. Explicit also
in this thesis is the recognition that Weber provides a long-needed doctrinal
foundation, albeit a limited one, for validating the concept of affirmative ac-
tion, which since 1961 has been central to the national policy against discrimi-
nation in employment.9
The implications of Weber for the implementation of race-conscious af-
firmative action cannot be understood without an examination of the factual
and legal background against which it was decided. Critical to an understand-
ing of that background is an examination of the conflict perceived by the
courts among the stated primary purpose of Title VII, the statutory language
chosen to carry out that purpose, and the competing theories of discrimination
or equality that the Supreme Court has read into the substantive provisions of
Title VII. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has resolved this conflict.
Part II of this Article develops the factual and legal background of
Weber. Part III analyzes and discusses Weber. The basic thesis of Part III is
two-fold. First, the analysis used by the majority-balancing the literal lan-
guage of Title VII with the primary purpose, or "spirit," of the Act-is an
attempt to accommodate the conflicting theories of equality read into the Act
by the Supreme Court.' 0 Second, by implication at least, Weber deals with
two questions that are of critical importance to the continued vitality of the
affirmative action concept: (1) whether race-conscious quotas are permissible
absent a legislative, judicial, or adminstrative finding of unlawful discrimina-
tion, and (2) whether the beneficiaries of affirmative action plans must them-
selves be identifiable victims of specific, as opposed to societal,
discrimination. " I
was an appropriate remedy in the circumstances of this employment case. 440 U.S. at 627. A
majority of the Court avoided these questions on the ground of mootness. 1Id
9. The concept of "affirmative action" as a remedial tool to combat discrimination in em-
ployment was first introduced in 1961 with the issuance of Exec. Order 10,925 by President Ken-
nedy. 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation). This order required the inclusion of the following
clause in all contracts with the federal government: 'The contractor will take affirmative action to
ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated dunn em loyment, without
regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin." Id at 450. Exec. Or der 1[,375, 3 C.F.R. 684
(1966-1970 Compilation), which became effective in October 1968, amended Exec. Order 11,246,
id at 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), the successor to Exec. Order 10,925, id at 448 (1959-1963
Compilation), by forbidding discrimination on the basis of sex by federal contractors.
10. See text accompanying notes 30-128 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 278-320 infra.
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II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Affirmative Action Concept
This nation unquestionably has a long way to go to achieve a society in
which the status of being a black person' 2 is as irrelevant as the color of one's
eyes. The affirmative action concept embodies a policy decision that some
forms of race-conscious remedies are necessary to improve the social and eco-
nomic status of blacks in our society. That policy decision, however, cannot
be isolated from the history that gave rise to the affirmative action concept.
When viewed in light of that history--decades of blatant public and private
discrimination against blacks as a group-the underlying premise of affirma-
tive action is manifest: If the chasm between "equality" as an abstract propo-
sition and "equality" as a reality is to be bridged, something more is needed
than mere prohibitions of positive acts of discrimination and the substitution
of passive neutrality. That something more, the affirmative action concept dic-
tates, must include race-conscious remedies.1
3
The crucial aspect of affirmative action is that it goes beyond the mere
12. Although racial discrimination is the dominant issue discussed in this Article, much of
the discussion is applicable to other kinds of discrimination, such as sex discrimination and ethnic
discrimination.
13. This point was stated succinctly by Justice Blackmun in his separate opinion concurring
in the judgement in Bakke:
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative action program in a
racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the
impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must fst take account afrace. There is no
other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.
We cannot-we dare not-let the Equal Protection Clause perpetrate racial supremacy.
438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Other courts and commentators also have acknowledged this need for race-conscious reme-
dies. In Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert,
denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974), the court noted:
[O]ur society cannot be completely colorblind in the short term if we are to have a color-
blind society in the long term. After centuries of viewing through colored lenses, eyes do
not quickly adjust when the lenses are removed. Discrimination has a way of perpetuat-
ing itself, albeit unintentionally, because the resulting inequalities make new opportuni-
ties less accessible. Preferential treatment is one partial prescription to remedy our
society's most intransigent and deeply rooted inequalities.
Id at 16. A former Solicitor at the Department of Labor has argued that
[N]ondiscrimination and affirmative action are not mutually exclusive concepts designed
to impale an employer upon the horns of a dilemma, but are wholly consistent and
equally obtainable both in theory and in practice. The theory is best understood by
acknowledgement of the fact that de facto discrimination permeates American society
despite our successes in combatting dejure discrimination. Thus, although an employer
may not seek to discriminate, neutral employment policies may have the effect of dis-
criminating against minorities. For instance, the recruitment policies of an employer
determined not to discriminate may in the actual selection of job applicants have the
effect of excluding minority persons unless a conscious effort is made to give the minority
community notice of outstanding job vacancies. If this is not done, minority applicants
will not appear to seek employment, and the employer will have no opportunity to place
his nondiscriminatory selection policy into effect. In this situation, taking affirmative
steps to broaden the recruitment base is wholly consistent with the employer's nondis-
crimination obligation.
Nash, Affinnative Action Under Executive Order No. 11,246, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 225, 230 (1971).
See also, Edwards & Zaretsky, PrVeerential Remediesfor Employment Discrimination, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (1975).
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adoption of a passive, prospective, nondiscriminatory principle and focuses on
active implementation of specific race-conscious remedies that are designed to
promote the status or number of discriminatees in a given setting. A race-
conscious remedy may be instituted by judicial mandate upon finding a statu-
tory violation,' 4 by voluntary action taken by an employer or institution based
on self-perceived discriminatory behavior, 15 or by legislative action, 16 execu-
tive action,' 7 or consent decree.' 8 Thus, it could be argued that affirmative
action is a recognition of the necessity of adopting theories of liability and
remedy that are not based solely on causation 19 and fault20 of a particular
14. E.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895
(1974) (en banc); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969).
15. E.g., Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976), va-
cated and remanded, 586 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1978).
16. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 631 note (Supp. III 1979) (requiring that selection panels "shall give due
consideration to all qualified individuals, especially such groups as women, blacks, Hispanics, and
other minorities."); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)
(requiring federal contractors to employ handicapped individuals); Vietnam Era Veterans' Read-
justment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (requiring government
contractors to adopt affirmative action procedures in the employment of veterans); Public Works
Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (Supp. I 1977) (the legality of the 10% set-aside
for minority enterprises was affirmed in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2759 (1979)).
17. Eg., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), as amended by
Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967), and Exec. Order No. 11,478 (1966-1970 Compila-
tion) (prohibiting government contractors from discriminating on the basis of race, sex, religion,
or national origin). See Nash, rm~unativeAction Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv.
225 (1971).
18. See, eg., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. deniedsub nom. Harris v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 425 U.S. 944 (1976); United States
v. City of Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill.), aj'd, 525 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1975); Comment,
Consent Decrees: Can They Withstandthe Charge a/Reverse Discrimination?, 19 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 115 (1979).
19. Underlying much of the controversy over the affirmative action principle is the question
of the extent to which the twin notions of "causation" and "fault" should be applicable in deter-mining both liability and remedy under laws prohibiting discrimination. The causation principle
relies heavily on principles of causation developed in tort law. Although there is some disagree-
ment about the outer fringes of the causation theory, two core principles run through much of the
discussion: to establish defendant's liability, plaintiff must establish both cause-in-fact and proxi-
mate cause. See, ag., James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951). As applied to em-
ployment discrimination cases, the causation principle would direct a court to find a defendant
liable whenever the plaintiff could show that race, for example, was both a cause-in-fact and a
proximate cause of an adverse employment decision. The cause-in-fact requirement is usually
tested by the familiar "but for" principle of tort law. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers &
Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 995-96 (5th Cir. 1969); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTs 102, 236-41 (4th ed. 1971); James & Perry, supra, at 762. See also Note, Tort
Remediesfor Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 54 VA. L. REv. 491 (1968). The defend-
ant's action need not be the sole cause in fact of the injury; it is sufficient that it be a cause in fact.
See Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1971).
For an attempt to build an entire theory on a civil rights version of proximate cause, see
Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52
N.Y.U.L. REv. 36, 42-99 (1977).
20. Under the "fault" notion, an underlying premise of the laws prohibiting discrimination is
the emphasis on the need to separate from the masses of society those blameworthy individuals
who are violating the otherwise shared norm that certain forms of discrimination are legally and
morally wrong. The "fault" idea is reflected in the assertion that only "intentional" discrimina-
tion violates the laws prohibiting discrimination. See, eg., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-
42 (1976) (cases emphasizing that both an act and an intent are necessary to effect intentional
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individual. The affirmative action concept is now explicit or implicit in every
major piece of federal legislation 2' or executive order22 dealing with wide-
ranging manifestations of discrimination.
23
Efforts to eliminate discrimination through affirmative action received
widespread and broad-based support when blatant forms of discrimination
were more prevalent. 24 However, the enthusiasm for the economic redistribu-
tion that had evolved during the 1960's civil rights era began to wane in 1971
when the worldwide economic recession started to have an impact on the
American economy. The continued expansion of the middle-class sector was
no longer assured, and white males who found themselves competing not only
with other white males but also with blacks, other minorities, and women,
began to seek judicial redress for their own claims of discrimination. Thus,
affirmative action became one of the more controversial and vigorously liti-
gated issues because it was claimed to impose discrimination in "reverse"
against white male citizens and was, therefore, legally and morally indefen-
sible.2
5
discrimination). In its pure form, intentional discrimination is conduct accompanied by a pur-
poseful desire to produce discriminatory results. One can thus evade liability for ostensibly dis-
criminatory conduct by showing that the action taken was for good reasons, e.g., Furnco Constr.
Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), or for no reason at all. The fault concept gives rise to a
complacency about one's own moral status. It creates a class of "innocents" who need not feel any
personal responsibility for the conditions associated with discrimination and who therefore feel
great resentment when called upon to bear any burden in connection with remedying violations.
This notion is reflected in the views of several of the Supreme Court Justices in employment
discrimination cases. E.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 781 (1976) (Burger, C.J,
dissenting in part, concurring in part). This resentment accounts for much of the ferocity sur-
rounding the "reverse discrimination" issue. See, e.g., N. GLASER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINA-
TION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975); B. GROSS, DISCRIMINATION IN REVERSE,
Is TURNABOUT FAIR PLAY? (1978); R. O'NEIL, DISCRIMINATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
(1975). See also Black, Civil Rights in Times of Economic Stress, 1976 ILL. L. F. 559, 565.
21. See generally 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 5001-5002 (1979); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSS-
MAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1976).
22. Exec. Order No. 11,141, 29 Fed. Reg. 2477 (1964) (proscribes age discrimination by fed-
eral contractors); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation) (proscribes dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, as amended); Exec. Order No.
11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation) (amends Exec. Order No. 11,246 by substituting
"religion" for "creed" and adding "sex" to the types of discrimination prohibited); Exec. Order
No. 11,758, 39 Fed. Reg. 2075 (1974) (employment of veterans by federal contractors); Exec. Or-
der No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1969) (equal employment opportunity in federal employ-
ment); Exec. Order No. 11,830, 40 Fed. Reg. 2411 (1975) (employment of the handicapped); Exec.
Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976) (also dealing with the handicapped); Exec. Order
No. 11,935, 41 Fed. Reg. 37,301 (1976) (requiring citizenship for federal employment). The orders
are collected and reprinted in I EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 1 3675-3764 (1978).
23. See generally UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT EFFORT (1971); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL
FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 20-23 (1979); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, TowARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: AFFIRMATIVE ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS
AT LAW AND MEDICAL SCHOOLS (1978).
24. See, e.g., Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Princpile, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2
(1976); Bell, Book Review, 25 EMORY L.J. 897 (1976).
25. A basic statement of the argument against the use of quotas based upon the affirmative
action principle is found in A. BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 133 (1975):
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contempo-
rary history have been the same for at least a generation: discrimination on the basis of
race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of demo-
cratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of
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The concepts of affirmative action and reverse discrimination are so inter-
twined as to make clear conceptual delineations, between them extremely
problematic. Both concepts have doctrinal foundations in the same constitu-
tional26 and statutory27 provisions. There appears to be a consensus, however,
that an issue of reverse discrimination arises only when the form of affirmative
action is articulated in terms of a race-conscious preference for blacks. A fun-
damental problem in the affirmative action/reverse discrimination controversy
is the alleged conflict between the desire to render the law "blind" as to partic-
ular attributes (for example, race) and the pragmatic need to prefer, in some
but not all circumstances, one group historically disadvantaged in its competi-
tion with others because of that attribute.2 8 This fundamental problem has
fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored. Those for whom racial
equality was demanded are to be more equal than others. Having found support in the
Constitution for equality, they now claim support for inequality under the same Consti-
tution. Yet a racial quota derogates the human dignity and individuality of all to whom
it is applied; it is invidious in principle as well as in practice. Moreover, it can easily be
turned against those it purports to help. The history of the racial quota is a history of
subjugation, not beneficence. Its evil lies not in its name but in its effect; a quota is a
divider of society, a creator of castes, and it is all the worse for its racial base, especially
in a society desperately striving for an equality that will make race irrelevant.
See also Van Alstyne, Rites ofPassage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 775 (1979).
26. The fourteenth amendment equal protection clause is the constitutional provision on
which a majority of the Court relied, for example, in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) (quotas questioned by a majority of the Court), and in Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (mathematical ratios based on race approved).
27. Title VII has been relied upon to sanction race-conscious quotas for blacks, see, e.g., Rios
v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974), and to uphold claims of
"reverse discrimination" of whites, see e.g., McAleer v. AT&T Co., 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C.
1976). See also EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 596 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1979).
28. The commentary on this subject is extensive. See, e.g., B. BITTKER, THE CASE OF BLACK
REPARATIONS (1973); N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION (1975); B. GROSS, supra note
20; R. O'NEIL, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS AND
THE DEFUNIS CASE (1975); Baldwin & Nagan, Board ofRegents v. Bakke: The.411-American Di-
lemma Revisited, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 843 (1978); Bell, Bakke, MinorityAdmissions, and the Usual
Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1979); Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice
Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CAL. L. REV. 21 (1979); Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Forward:
In Defense oftheAntidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16-22 (1976); Ely, The Constitu-
tionality oReverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Edwards & Zaretsky,
supra note 13 (1975); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF.
107 (1976); Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems ofReverse Discrimination, 67 CAL. L. REV. 87
(1979); Hastie,,Affirmative 4ction in Vindicating Civil Rights, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 502; Kaplan, Equal
Justice in an Unequal World; Equalityfor the Negro--The Problem ofSpecial Treatment, 61 Nw.
U.L. REV. 363 (1966); Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative.4ction andEqualProtection, 60 VA. L. REV.
955 (1974); Nagel, Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination, 2 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF.
348 (1973); O'Neil, akke in Balance: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 67 CAL. L. REV. 143 (1979);
O'Neil, Racial Pre/erence and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REV. 925 (1974);
Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of"AffirmativeAction,".67 CAL. L. REV. 171 (1979); Pos-
ner, The DeFunis Case andthe Constitutionality ofPre/erential Treatment ofRacialMinorities, 1974
Sup. CT. REV. 1; Ravenell, DeFunis and Bakke... The Voice Not Heard, 21 How. L.J. 128
(1978); Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial
Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975); Sedler, RacialPreference, Reality and the Constitution: Bakce
v. Regents of the University of California, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329 (1977); Seeburger, .4
Heuristic Argument Against PreferentialAdmissions, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 285 (1977).
The color-blind theory was first given explicit recognition in 1896: "Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
An argument has been advanced that a claim of "reverse discrimination" is a legal fiction and
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not been resolved and lies at the heart of Weber. Moreover, the legal develop-
ments prior to Weber exacerbated rather than ameliorated this fundamental
problem.
A review of the primary purpose of Title VII and the theories of discrimi-
nation that developed out of its statutory language demonstrates the existence
of conflicting policy and value choices that Congress left to the courts to de-
cide. However, the courts either fail to resolve these policy and value choices,
or, if they make a choice, they erode the doctrinal underpinnings of that choice
while at the same time professing to adhere to "settled principles."'29 These
judicial shortcomings account for much of the controversy over race-conscious
affirmative action at the time Weber was decided.
B. Conflict Between the Purpose of Title VII and Theories of Equality
The primary purpose of Title VII was to improve the economic status of
blacks as a group.30 Of all the civil rights legislation enacted prior to 1965,
Title VII alone was aimed at the economic oppression of blacks, and few do-
that in reality the advancement of minorities and women up the economic ladder is not the be-
stowal of a privilege but the removal of unearned benefits from members of the majority:
The documentation of past discrimination against minorities also serves to docu-
ment its counterpart: unfair advantages to non-minorities. If minorities are under-
represented . . it is safe to assume that non-minorities are overrepresented. Stated
simply, what society has been taking from minorities, it has been giving to its non-minor-
ities. The reverse discrimination aspect of affirmative action is, in reality, the removal of
that benefit which American society has for so long bestowed, without question upon its
privileged classes. The question, viewed in this light, becomes: "Is the removal of a
benefit, given for centuries to some at the expense of others, truly a discrimination
against that long-privileged class?"
Comment, The Myth of Reverse Discrimination: An Historical Perspective, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
319, 322 (1974).
29. Compare, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), with McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). See generaly Edwards, The ComingAge of the Burger
Court: Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court During the 1976 Term, 19 B.C.L. REV. 1, 4-36
(1977).
30. Extensive hearings in Congress leading to the Civil Riohts Act of 1964 focused national
attention on the adverse social and economic position of blacks m employment and other areas of
society. See, e.g., Hearing on Equal Opportunity Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Education andLabor, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, 12-15, 47-48, 53-55, 61-63 (1963);
Hearing on Civil Rights Before Subcoma. No. 5 of the House Comrm on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 2300-03 (1963); Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity Before the Subcomm. on Em-
ployment and Manpower of the Senate Comm on Labor and Public We//are, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
116-17, 321-29, 426-30, 449-52, 492-94 (1963).
Also, the Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), noted that
[a]s the Court observed in Griggs Y. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 429-430, the pri-
mary objective [of Title VII] was a prophylactic one:
"It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees."
Id at 417 (emphasis added). The Court previously had found this objective to be "plain from the
language of the statute." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971). Again, in McDon-
nell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973), the Court emphasized that the primary purpose
of Title VII was to "assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrimi-
natory practices and devices which have fostered racially ratified job environments to the disad-
vantage of minority citizens.' See also EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND IX OF
Tm CIVI. RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 1-11 (1968). See generally M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON
RAcIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966).
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mestic problems have proved more tractable or received more scholarly atten-
tion than the depressed economic position of that group.3 ' The statutory
language that Congress chose to carry out this purpose, however, provides a
remedy that is not limited to blacks. Other groups, whether defined in terms
of race, sex, ethnicity, or religion, also are given the protection of Title VII.
32
Therefore, although it is clear that the primary purpose of Title VII was to
provide a remedy for blacks, the effectuation of that purpose is inextricably
linked to how the concept of "equality" (or "discrimination") should be con-
strued in light of the broad statutory language used by Congress.
There are two basic concepts of equality that have been discussed in the
31. For a reader on the civil rights struggle in the twentieth century reflecting the diversity of
skills and people it has engaged, see J. FRANKLIN & I. STARR, THE NEGRO IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY AMERICA (1967). See also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EMPLOYMENT (1961).
See generally U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 30, THE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL VIEW,
1970-1978 (1979).
32. The broad prohibitory language of Title VII provides in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)-(c)
(1976):
(a) Employers. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) Employment Agency. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to
classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
(c) Labor Organization. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor
organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership or
to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of
such individuals race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against any individual
in violation of this section.
Title VII is not the first statute primarily concerned with improving the status of
blacks but containing language potentially in conflict with that purpose. For example,
the Congress that enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), was
primarily concerned with providing protection for the newly emancipated blacks. Yet, a
principle of equality of treatment for all persons (except perhaps women qua women) is
sounded in the congressional debates. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 408 F. Supp. 916, 919-25 (S.D. Tex.
1976); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Wilson). See
generally Buchanan, The Questfor Freedon" A Legal History of The Thirteenth Amend-
ment, 12 Hous. L. REv. 1, 3-23 (1974).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cases and the literature. 33 In most situations each yields a different outcome in
the implementation of affirmative action. One conception of equality is equal
treatment. It embraces the notion of color-blindness and focuses on fairness to
the individual instead of fairness to the group of which he is a member. Under
this view individual blacks should be treated "equally" by an employer in the
sense that race should not be a factor in an employment decision. This con-
ception of equality is often analogized to positions in a foot race: if race is
eliminated as a factor in the employment decision, blacks will be on an equal
footing with whites. 34 An ambiguity exists, however, in the implementation of
this view, because a pure application would prohibit consideration of race in
all circumstances, even if the result is to perpetuate continuing effects of prior
discrimination.35 Another application of this theory, one more consistent with
decisions of the Supreme Court, would permit, and in some cases require, con-
sideration of race in effectuating a remedy based upon a judicial, legislative, or
administrative finding of unlawful discrimination against a group or an indi-
vidual member of a group.36 The Supreme Court has found support for the
equal treatment concept in section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, which makes it an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against "any
33. These two conceptions of equality are explained in Fiss, A Theory ofFair Employment
Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 235, 237-49 (1971).
The court in Local 189, Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), (citing Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination and
the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1260 (1967)), articulated several possible theories of
equality under Title VII. The "freedom now" theory would allow blacks who had been the vic-
tims of discrimination immediately to replace whites who "but for" the past discrimination would
not now enjoy the employment benefit they now enjoy. The "status quo" theory would allow an
employer who has been found guilty of unlawful discrimination to satisfy the requirement of Title
VII by merely ending explicit racial discrimination. Under the "status quo" theory, whatever
unfortunate effects of discrimination there might be in the future as to those blacks who were the
victims of past discrimination would be considered merely as an incident of the now extinguished
discrimination. The court found that the "rightful place" theory stands between "freedom now"
and "status quo." Under the "rightful place" theory, Title VII would be construed as prohibiting
thefuture awarding ofjobs on the basis of a system found to be unlawful and which has the effect
of perpetuating the effects of past discrimination.
34. Fiss, supra note 33, at 237.
35. For example, in upholding a claim of reverse discrimination in employment brought by a
white male, the court in Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673, 681 (E.D.
Va. 1976), vacated, 586 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1978), stated:
There will never be sex or racial peace until the idea of sex and racial discrimination is
dead and buried. The primary--the only-beneficiaries of affirmative action plans and
their siblings are the thousands of persons engaged in the civil rights business, bureau-
crats, lawyers, lobbyists and politicians. The persons who are suffering are the ostensible
objects of the plans' solicitude, and persons, such as plaintiff herein, who get flattened by
the civil rights steamroller.
The only means of ridding the nation of invidious discrimination is to tear it out
"root and branch," Green v. ScA. Bd ofNewKent Co., 391 U.S. 430,438. . .(1968).
Affirmative action only perpetuates it.
36. The color-blind theory has never become the law. The Supreme Court has explicitly
upheld the remedial use of racial classifications on a number of occasions. See, e.g., United Jew-
ish Organization v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451
(1972); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See also Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300-02, 301 n.40 (Powell, J.); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs,
391 U.S. 450 (1968).
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individual... because of such individuals race." 37 Claims of reverse discrim-
ination such as Weber's are based on the equal treatment theory.
A second conception of equality is equal opportunity (or equal achieve-
ment). This view recognizes that race sometimes must be considered when
distributing jobs among racial groups38 and requires those subject to Title VII
to consider race in appropriate cases to ensure that discrimination is not per-
petuated against protected classes. Only decisions that do not continue to dis-
advantage protected classes would be permitted. It is concerned also with both
the quantity and quality (measured, for example, by income levels and status)
of the jobs for which blacks are employed. Under this view of equality, jobs
are to be distributed so that the relative economic position of blacks as a group
is improved, making the economic status of blacks approximately equal to that
of whites. Both the elimination of disproportionate underrepresentation of
blacks in all levels of the actual work force of an employer and their overrep-
resentation in the unemployed ranks in the relevant labor market are the aims
of this view of equality. Proponents of the second view of equality reject the
equal treatment view as a spurious sort of equality because it fails to accom-
modate for the present and continuing effect of past discrimination.39 The
Supreme Court has found statutory support in Title VII for the equal opportu-
nity view of equality in section 703(a)(2), which provides that it is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to "limit, segregate, or classify his em-
ployees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunity or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race .... -40
The affirmative action principle is based in substantial part on the equal op-
portunity theory of equality.
Support for both views of equality is found in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. ,41 the first major substantive Title VII employment discrimination deci-
sion by the Supreme Court. Much of the controversy surrounding race-con-
scious affirmative action can be traced directly to Griggs, notwithstanding its
profound impact on the development of employment discrimination law.42
An analysis of Griggs shows that it provides doctrinal support both for race-
conscious affirmative action plans and claims of reverse discrimination. In
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) (emphasis added); see Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978); McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
38. See Fiss, supra note 33, at 237-38. President Johnson articulated the concept of affirma-
tive action he intended the Executive Order to implement in a commencement address at Howard
University in 1965: "You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and
liberate him, bring him up to the starting fine in a race and then say, 'you are free to compete with
all other' and still justly believe that you have been completely fair." Address by President John-
son, Howard University Commencement (May 1965) (Presidential Papers of Johnson).
39. See, e.g., Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 13, at 1; Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment
Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. Rav. 341.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976) (emphasis added); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
41. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
42. Griggs has been called "the most important court decision in employment discrimination
law." B. SCHLE1 & P. GRossmAN, supra note 21, at 5.
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retrospect, a critical analysis of Griggs suggests that it is, perhaps, a legal cen-
terpiece of major internal contradictions. Moreover, the seeds of Weber were
sown there and were nurtured in later cases.
1. Griggs-Disparate Impact and Group Remedies
Griggs v. Duke Power established the critically important concept of dis-
crimination on which affirmative action is based. In Griggs the Court held for
the first time that a facially neutral employment practice that was not purpose-
fully discriminatory, but that nevertheless had the effect of excluding a group
on the basis of race, was discrimination4 3 and, if not shown by the employer to
be job-related, was unlawful. Prior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title
VII, Duke Power Company openly engaged in racial discrimination against
blacks. Although the company did not totally exclude blacks from its work
force, it had an overt policy to limit the employment of blacks to "dead-end"
jobs in one of its five departments. After Title VII became effective in 1965,
the company abandoned its explicit policy of discrimination. However, to
transfer out of the "dead-end" jobs, blacks either had to have a high school
diploma or score successfully on two professionally developed ability tests.
These post-Act requirements operated to limit severely the employment op-
portunities of blacks because whites as a group had a higher percentage of
high school diplomas and scored better on the tests than blacks as a group.
Duke Power had taken no steps to determine whether persons having high
school diplomas and scoring successfully on the tests made better employees.
Thus, the case raised the question of the lawfulness of a facially neutral em-
ployment policy that achieved essentially the same results as overt discrimina-
tion. The Court in Griggs articulated the issue as follows:
[W]hether an employer is prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title VII, from requiring a high school education or passing of a
standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment
in or transfer to a job when (a) neither standard is shown to be signif-
icantly related to successful job performance, (b) both requirements
operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than
white applicants, and (c) the jobs in question formerly had been filed
only by white employees as part of a long-standing practice of giving
preference to whites. 44
A unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, answered
the question in the affirmative.
The Court could have grounded its decision solely on a rationale directed
to subpart (c) of the question posed above and held that post-Act perpetuation
43. Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), empowers courts both to enjoin
defendants from engaging in unlawful employment practices and to order such affirmative relief
as may be appropriate. There is only one major statutory limitation on the grant of remedial relief
under Title VII-no relief may be granted in the absence of a finding that the defendant has
"intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice." Id
44. 401 U.S. at 425-26.
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of pre-Act purposeful discrimination violates Title VII. The Court's discus-
sion of the primary purpose of Title VII supports this rationale:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of em-
ployment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained
if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory em-
ployment practices. 45
The "prior discriminatory" practices demonstrated in the record were overt
pre-Act discriminatory hiring and assignment practices. Had the Court
adopted this rationale as its sole basis for decision, it arguably would have
meant that, absent a history of overt discrimination, the high school diploma
and testing requirements would have been valid, no matter how disproportion-
ate their impact may be on blacks. 46 The Court chose, however, not to depend
solely on a finding of prior discrimination and, in doing so, had to find a dif-
ferent rationale for its decision.
Alternatively, the Court could have adopted the rationale used in a voting
rights case it had decided several years earlier. In Gaston County v. United
States47 the Court refused to approve a voting literacy test that, because of the
inferior education inherent in segregated schools in North Carolina, arguably
was designed to limit black voter registration. The automatic "triggering" pro-
visions of the Voting Rights Act of 196548 had suspended Gaston County's
literacy test because certain indicia chosen by Congress raised a presumption
that the test was being used to discriminate against blacks seeking to register.
In order to reinstate its test under the Voting Rights Act, Gaston County had
to show that it had not used the test in the preceding five years "for the pur-
45. Id at 429-30. A theory of present effects of past discrimination, te., the perpetuation into
the post-Act period of the effects of pre-Act discrimination, was relied upon by the court of ap-
peals to find that some of the plaintiffs in Griggs were entitled to relief. 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.
1970). This theory, however, was most effectively used in the seniority discrimination cases. See,
e.g., Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968); Local 189, United Paper-
makers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). See also
Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade ofPrivate Enforcement and Judicial
Developments, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225, 257-66 (1976). This theory, as applied in the seniority
cases, seemed well-developed prior to the Supreme Court decision in Griggs. But see Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
46. For example, the Court noted in Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
309 (1977), that an "employer who from [the effective date of Title VII] forward made all its
employment decisions in a wholly nondiscriminatory way would not violate Title VII even if it
had formerly maintained an all-white work force by purposefully excluding [blacks]."
47. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
48. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 & 1973 (1976), requires political units
that use a voting test or device and have relatively low turnouts to obtain advance approval of
changes in their voting requirements from the Attorney General or the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Id § 1973c (1970). A political unit can gain an exception
from this provision if it shows that it has not used a voting test or device in a discriminatory
mannr. Id A nonexempt political unit must show that the proposed change in requirements
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color." Id
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [
pose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color."'49 The district court found that the county's black schools had
not provided blacks with educational opportunities equal to those available to
whites. That alone, the Court held, would make the imposition of a literacy
test an act of continuing discrimination.50 Under the Gatson County rationale,
the tests and high school requirements in Griggs would have been violations
only to the extent that they penalized blacks for the inferior education they
had received in the segregated schools. Some language in Griggs suggests that
the Court relied in part on this rationale: "Basic intelligence must have the
means of articulation to manifest itself fairly in a testing process. Because they
are [blacks], petitioners have long received inferior education in segregated
schools and this Court expressly recognized these differences in Gaston
County. .... ,,51 Had this been the dominant rationale in Griggs, the case es-
sentially would have been just another school desegregation case. The viola-
tion of Title VII would have been not the employer's selection procedure but
rather the pre-existing system of de jure segregated schools.
A straightforward application of Gaston County to Griggs would have
suspended all test and diploma requirements only until blacks no longer suf-
fered the residual effect of an inferior segregated education. While the Court
was willing to allow all citizens, blacks as well as whites, to vote regardless of
literacy, it recognized that Congress did not intend for all employees and job
applicants to be promoted or hired without regard to basic job qualifications. 52
Thus, it was necessary for the Court in Griggs to develop a rationale that
would identify those instances in which a test or other facially neutral employ-
ment policy would be lawful, even against blacks who had suffered from his-
torical or societal discrimination. To develop this rationale, the Court focused
on the relationship of the tests and diploma requirements to the employee's
ability to perform the job. Under this analysis, the company's overt pre-Act
discriminatory practices were irrelevant because the issue was limited to
whether under Title VII the employer's selection procedure that dispropor-
tionately affected blacks was necessary to the conduct of its business, regard-
less of the educational experience of the employees and applicants.5 3
Thus, the central rationale of Griggs is that employment practices and
policies, even facially neutral ones, that have a disparate impact or adverse
effect on the employment opportunities of blacks are unlawful under Title VII
unless they can be demonstrated to be job-related and mandated by business
necessity. "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is busi-
ness necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude [blacks]
49. Id § 1973b. See 395 U.S. at 293.
50. 395 U.S. at 29. See also Fiss, Gaston County v. United States: Fruition of the Freezing
Prineoile, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 379.
51. 401 U.S. at 430.
52. Id ("Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to every person
regardless of qualifications.").
53. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohib-
ited."'54 The standard of business necessity was held to be extremely rigorous,
demanding a showing of job-relatedness and the removal of "artificial, arbi-
trary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate in-
vidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification."15 5 Standards that "measure the person for the job and not the
person in the abstract" 56 are prohibited. In short, Griggs demands that em-
ployers and unions transform the theory of meritocracy into reality. The
Court, by adopting the disparate impact or adverse effects theory of discrimi-
nation, accepted, based on a construction of section 703(a)(2) of Title VII,
57
the equal opportunity concept of equality. It therefore changed, in a very
profound way, the concept of discrimination.
Griggs also established the doctrinal foundations for the implementation
of race-conscious affirmative action. This reading is derived from the Court's
refusal to require a plaintiff to prove purposeful pre- or post-Act discrimina-
tion by the employer. The Court's rationale makes clear that "good intent, or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures that
operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups" 58 and that "Congress di-
rected the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not
simply the motivation."5 9 Under the Griggs disparate impact theory an em-
ployer is put on notice that he is discriminating within the meaning of Title
VII if he continues to use an employment practice that has a disparate impact
on, or is unfair to, a protected class and cannot be justified on grounds of
business necessity.
With its emphasis on the consequences of an employment practice, the
importance of Griggs to the affirmative action principle was the recognition
that, while section 703(a) speaks in terms of individuals, the real problem of
employment discrimination is not one of isolated cases of bigotry directed to-
ward particular persons. Rather, the real problems lie in the institutionalized
societal practices and policies, such as testing procedures, subjective selection
standards, race and sex-role stereotypes, and seniority rules, that systemati-
cally exclude certain minority groups from the workforce and from certain job
classifications. Although Congress appeared not to have fully understood the
impact of the systemic aspect of discrimination when it originally enacted Title
VII in 1964,60 the federal courts, particularly in the South (because of their
54. 401 U.S. at 431.
55. Id
56. Id at 436. See Belton, supra note 45, at 254-57:
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976). See Belton, supra note 45, at 240-46; Blumrosen, Stran-
gers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Discrimination, 71 MIcH. L. Rev.
59 (1972).
58. 401 U.S. at 432.
59. Id (emphasis in original).
60. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, in its 1979 report recommending
amendments to strengthen the enforcement of Title VII, said it could not "stress too much the
importance of the 'pattern and practice' approach" to the problem of employment discrimination.
The Committee outlined the reasons for this recommendation as follows:
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extensive experience with other forms of discrimination), 61 realized almost im-
mediately that employment discrimination was inherently class, rather than
individual, discrimination:
Race discrimination is by definition a class discrimination ....
[A]lthough the actual effects of a discriminatory policy may. . . vary
throughout the class, the existence of the discriminatory policy
threatens the entire class. And whether the Damoclean threat of a
racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class is a question
of fact common to all the members of the class.
62
Griggs also affirmed a body of law that was developing in the lower courts
which held that Title VII suits are "perforce" class actions and that an individ-
ual Title VII plaintiff is cloaked with the responsibilities of a private attorney
general when he seeks to remedy employment discrimination.63 This develop-
ment was a recognition that the primary objective of Title VII could be ob-
tained only by eliminating widespread, institutionalized discrimination
through emphasis on class remedies. The Griggs reading of Title VII was in
harmony with its primary purpose.
In addition, the Griggs emphasis on consequences validated the use of
statistics as a method to establish discrimination. Proof of discrimination
against particular individuals requires evidence relating primarily to a particu-
lar incident, but proof of discrimination inherent in institutionalized practices
requires a much broader approach-an approach that relies almost exclusively
on statistics.64 The Griggs prima facie rule, or rule of exclusion, requires a
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and
distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some identifiable
individuals or organizations .... Employment, as viewed today, is a far more complex
and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject generally describe the
problem in terms of 'systems' and 'effects' rather than simply intentional wrongs....
In short, the problem is one whose resolution in many instances requires not only expert
assistance, but also the technical perception that a problem exists in the first place, and
the system complained of is unlawful.
S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), cited with approval in Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 n.21 (1976).
. The General Accounting Office, after a two-year study of the EEOC, strongly recommended
that the agency's efforts be directed toward ending institutional discrimination. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, EEOC HAS MADE LIMITED PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING EMPLOYMENT DIs-
CRIMINATION 46 (1976).
61. See generally C. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND BLACK VOTERS (1973); J. PELTASON, FiFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FED-
ERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961); F. READ & L. McGoUOH, LET THEM BE
JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH (1978).
62. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). 4ccord, Oatis v.
Crown Zellerback Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
63. See, eg., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v.
United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbuch Corp., 398 F.2d 496,
499 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
64. Compare, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), with, e.g., McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-02 (1973). In response to an argument advanced in Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), that statistics have no probative value in discrimination
cases, the Court held that "our cases make it unmistakably clear that '[s]tatistical analyses have
served and will continue to serve an important role' in cases in which the existence of discrimina-
tion is a disputed issue .... We have repeatedly approved the use of statistical proof, where it
reached proportions comparable to those in this case, to establish a prima facie case of racial
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plaintiff to show a significant disparity between the percentage of class mem-
bers in the work force and the percentage in the relevant labor market.65 This
showing constitutes a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination and shifts
the "burden of proof' 66 to the employer.67 The defendant's burden under the
Griggs prima facie rule is a heavy one and cannot be overcome by general
assertions of nondiscrimination. 68 The Supreme Court approved the heavy
reliance on statistics for three basic reasons. First, and most obviously, the one
inevitable consequence of systematic discrimination is the consistent under-
representation of blacks in jobs from which they have been excluded. Under-
representation is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination and is
therefore highly probative.69 Second, statistics are frequently the best avail-
able evidence of discrimination because discrimination will seldom, if ever, be
admitted by any employer.70 Third, under a Griggs analysis, subjective moti-
vation is not critical to a finding of unlawful discrimination.
71
The provision of Title VII that, if literally construed, argues against the
Griggs disparate impact theory is section 7030). This section prohibits em-
ployers and unions from granting "preferential treatment to any individual or
to any group" because of race to remedy a statistical imbalance in the em-
ployer's work force.72 The Supreme Court, nevertheless, declined to read this
discrimination in jury selection cases. .... [S]tatistics are equally competent in proving employ-
ment discrimination." Id at 339 (citations omitted).
65. See Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Dis-
parate Impact 4nalysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1977); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie
Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387
(1975).
66. See note 106 infra.
67. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
68. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.24 (1977) (quoting Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
69. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977). "Statistics showing racial or
ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a
telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of
the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which employees are
hired."
70. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977); United States v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 412 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978) ('[In an
age where it is unfashionable ... to openly express racial hostility, direct evidence of overt big-
otry will be impossible to find"); Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th
Cir. 1971). See also Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
71. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. at 432; Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976) provides:
(j) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or
group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by
any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor
organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admit-
ted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with
the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national
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section as a limitation on the disparate impact theory. In rejecting the argu-
ment that section 7030) imposes a statutory barrier on the use of statistics, the
Court, in Teamsters v. United States73 stated:
The argument fails in this case because the statistical evidence was
not offered or used to support an erroneous theory that Title VII re-
quires an employer's work force to be racially balanced. Statistics
showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as
this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of pur-
poseful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be ex-
pected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a
work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic com-
position of the population in the community from which employees
are hired. Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity between the
composition of a work force and that of the general population thus
may be significant even though § 703() makes clear that Title VII
imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general popula-
tion. . . . Considerations such as small sample size may, of course,
detract from the value of such evidence. . ., and evidence showing
that the figures for the general population might not accurately re-
flect the pool of qualified job applicants would also be relevant.74
After Griggs the courts began to develop a coherent body of employment
discrimination law based primarily on the disparate impact theory. Then, in
1975, the Supreme Court decided Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,75 which es-
tablished the "make whole" theory of relief. Moody directed the lower courts,
upon a finding of liability, to use the authority under section 706(g) of Title
VIF6 to enter broad remedial orders to eradicate discrimination throughout
the economy and make persons whole for injuries suffered through past dis-
crimination.77 Moody was read by the majority of the lower courts as an affir-
mation of the general course these courts had taken already, namely, to
construe Title VII in a broad and flexible manner.78
The substantive developments on issues of both liability and remedies
under the Griggs/Moody line of cases had a substantial impact on the congres-
sionally favored enforcement of Title VII through voluntary compliance.79
origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in
any community, State, section, or other area.
73. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
74. Id at 339 n.20 (citations omitted).
75. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
77. 422 U.S. at 421.
78. See generally Belton, supra note 45, at 289-300.
79. When the House Judiciary issued its report on the bill which became the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, it clearly stated that a primary objective of the Act was to encourage voluntary action to
eliminate the effects of discrimination against blacks:
In various regions of the country there is discrimination against some minority
groups. Most glaring, however, is the discrimination against Negroes which exists
throughout our Nation. Today, more than 100 years after their formal emancipation,
Negroes, who make up over 10 percent of our population, are by virtue of one or another
type of discrimination not accorded the rights, privileges, and opportunities which are
considered to be, and must be, the birthright of all citizens.
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On more than one occasion prior to Weber, the Supreme Court had under-
scored the importance of voluntary compliance by employers to the effectua-
tion of the national policy against discrimination in employment. For
example, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. ,80 the Court held that an indi-
vidual does not forfeit his private right of action under Title VII if he first
pursues his employment discrimination claim through arbitration under a
nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement. The Court, al-
though noting that ultimate enforcement authority rests with federal courts, 81
stated:
Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the pre-
ferred means for achieving [the] goal [of assuring equality of employ-
ment opportunity]. To this end, Congress created the [EEOC] and
established a procedure whereby existing state and local equal em-
loyment opportunity agencies, as well as the Commission, would
have an opportunity to settle disputes through conference, concilia-
tion, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was permitted to file
a lawsuit.
82
Also, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody the Court recognized that the role of
the courts in carrying out the congressional preference for voluntary compli-
ance is to establish the legal guidelines that provide the "spur or catalyst which
causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their em-
ployment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last
vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history."
8 3
Moody thus contemplates that there would be substantial voluntary compli-
ance with the laws prohibiting employment discrimination without the inter-
vention of the administrative or the judicial coercive process.
The broadest statement from the Court on the extent to which employers
and unions may engage in voluntary compliance is found in Franks v. Bowman
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and consequences of
racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. There is reason to believe,
however, that national leadership provided by the enactment of Federal legislation deal-
ing with the most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to volun-
tary or local resolution of other forms of discrimination.
It is, however, possible and necessary for the Congress to enact legislation which
prohibits and provides the means of terminating the most serious types of discrimination.
H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2355, 2393.
Congress by statute also directed the EEOC, the federal agency responsible for implementing
much of Title VII, to attempt to conciliate charges as the initial effort to resolve discrimination
claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976) provides, in pertinent part, that: "If the Commission deter-
mines... that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall
endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion." See also 110 Cong. Rec. 2566 (1964) (House debate on
amendment to clarify the EEOC's duty to attempt to conciliate prior to court action).
80. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
81. Id at44.
82. Id
83. 422 U.S. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir.
1973)).
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Transportation Co. ,84 and had particular significance for Weber-type defend-
ants. In Franks the Court, in rejecting the argument that an award of retroac-
tive seniority to black victims of discrimination deprived white employees of
seniority rights conferred by a collective bargaining agreement, stated:
The Court has also held that a collective-bargaining agreement may
go further, enhancing the seniority status of certain employees for
purposes of furthering public policy interests beyond what is re-
quired by statute, even though this will to some extent be detrimental
to the expectations acquired by other employees under the previous
seniority agreement. And the ability of the union and employer vol-
untarily to modify the seniority system to the end of ameliorating the
effects of past racial discrimination, a national policy objective of the
"highest priority" is certainly no less than in other areas of public
policy interests.
85
The recognition in Franks that employers and unions may adopt remedies
pursuant to collective bargaining that enhance national public policy interests
under Title VII, even though they may adversely affect the employment expec-
tancies of some whites,8 6 was a strong endorsement of the affirmative action
concept, and provided a strong incentive to employers and unions to imple-
ment affirmative action plans to remedy employment discrimination when
Griggs-type disparate impact is manifest.
Franks also rejected the argument that an award of retroactive seniority
to identifiable victims of discrimination would be inequitable because it would
adversely affect the employment expectancies of "innocent" white employees.
The Court took the position that "a sharing of the burden of the past discrimi-
nation [between the black victims and the innocent white employees] is pre-
sumptively necessary-is entirely consistent with any fair characterization of
equity jurisdiction, particularly when considered in light of our traditional
view that '[a]ttainment of a great national policy . . . must not be confined
within narrow canons for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancellors in
ordinary private controversies.' "87
While the encouragement of voluntary compliance is more a procedural
than a substantive requirement of Title VII, public policy considerations that
84. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
85. Id at 778-79 (citations omitted).
86. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50
(1975), in which the Supreme Court ruled that, although national labor policy accords the highest
priority to nondiscriminatory employment practices, the National Labor Relations Act does not
protect concerted activity by minority employees who seek to bypass their union representative
and bargain directly with their employer over issues of employment discrimination. The Court
ruled in effect that even if the relief available under Title VII is inadequate, because the legal
procedures are too cumbersome or time-consuming, dissident employee action taken against an
employer to protest against alleged race discrimination is not justified. The Court thus concluded
that employee interest (at least under the NLRA) may be adequately protected when a union is
serving as the employees' exclusive bargaining agent and where a collective-bargaining agreement
adequately provides for nondiscrimination and makes available a grievance-arbitration procedure
to redress employee complaints.
87. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777-78 (1976) (quoting Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941)) (footnote omitted).
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underlie this congressional policy were as much at issue in Weber as were the
substantive theories and the purpose of the Act. Congress recognized that the
effectuation of the national policy against discrimination would be unduly
protracted if all enforcement had to be routed through the courts. Thus, it was
deemed necessary to the effective enforcement of the Act, as well as to the
efficient operation of the judiciary, that as many employment discrimination
cases as possible be resolved through private, voluntary compliance to avoid
flooding the already over-burdened dockets of the federal courts.
88
By 1976 the Supreme Court had attempted to harmonize the primary pur-
pose of the Act with its statutory language. The Court also had clearly estab-
lished firm doctrinal foundations for the implementation of race-conscious
remedies based upon the affirmative action concept. The lessons of Griggs,
Moody, and Franks were not lost on private and public employers, unions,
and federal enforcement agencies. Even though there was a dramatic increase
in the number of employment discrimination cases filed in the federal courts,8 9
more and more of the major cases were resolved through consent decrees or
voluntary compliance. 90 It was possible, therefore, to conclude that to the ex-
tent there were "settled principles" in employment discrimination law, they
were firmly in support of the affirmative action concept.
Disparate impact analysis assumed an increased significance in the en-
forcement of Title VII after Griggs. The Griggs concept of equality became a
demand for results and virtually compelled employers and unions, such as
defendants in Weber, to adopt affirmative action programs. A potential de-
fendant who wished to avoid liability under Title VII, or who wished to avoid
88. There was a "staggering" increase in the number of Title VII cases filed between 1970
and 1976, from 344 employment discrimination cases filed in federal courts in fiscal year 1970 to
5,321 in fiscal year 1976. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1976 ANN.
REP. OF THE DIRECTOR 107-08. This increase is understandable given that the coverage of Title
VII was expanded by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 5314-
5316, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-17 (1976). See, e.g.,
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 841 (1976). Also the interpretation of Title VII on numer-
ous issues was first clarified during this period. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); Belton, supra note 45.
89. The enormous rate in Title VII filings slowed after fiscal year 1976. While there was an
increase of 1,390 filings or of 35.4% from fiscal year 1975 to fiscal year 1976 (3,931 filings as
compared to 5,321 filings), in fiscal year 1977 there was an increase of 610 filings or of 11% to
5,931. In fiscal year 1978 there was a decrease of 427 filings or of 7% (from 5,931 to 5,504 filings).
ADMINSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1978 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR 88.
While it is difficult to draw hard conclusions from the decrease in the rate of Title VII case
filings, it may be inferred that the clarifications in the law and the emphasis on voluntary affirma-
tive action were beginning to have an effect. If voluntary affimative action were severely re-
stricted--as it would have been if the Fifth Circuit had been affirmed in Weber--the remedy for
employment discrimination would lie primarily in the courts and not in voluntary compliance,
and a return to an increasing rate of Title VII cases could be expected. Cf. Belton, A Comparative
Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Tifle VII of the Civil Rights 4 ct of 1964, 31 VAND. L.
REV. 905, 951-52 (1978) (increase in number of Title VII cases due to more involvement by nonin-
stitutional lawyers).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.: 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Pa.
1973), aft'd, 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974); Belton, supra note 89, at 950-52.
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the costly and cumbersome validation process9' to determine the job-related-
ness of his employment practices, could adopt a race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion program designed to increase the number of blacks in his work force and
thus reduce the disparity between blacks and whites. Griggs in effect required
employers to remedy societal discrimination. Absent the historical backdrop
against which Title VII was enacted, certainly nothing in the legislative history
would have required employers to improve the validity of their employment
criteria. Griggs thus offered employers a choice: either affirmatively demon-
strate that selection procedures are based on merit, or neutralize the disparate
impact through race-conscious affirmative action programs.
2. McDonnell Douglas-Disparate Treatment and Fairness to the
Individual
The 1976 Term of the Supreme Court brought a major doctrinal shift in
employment discrimination law.92 The major emphasis during and after this
Term was on the equal treatment concept of equality with its emphasis on
fairness to the individual. This concept of equality is essentially the same as
the disparate treatment theory of discrimination. Although the doctrinal foun-
dations of the equal treatment concept were developed more fully during and
after the 1976 Term, the seeds of those foundations can be traced directly to
Griggs. The Court in Griggs had relied on legislative intent to formulate the
disparate impact theory of discrimination. It likewise relied on legislative his-
tory for this basic proposition:
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to
every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not
command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly
the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minor-
ity group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or ma-
jority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed.
93
This strand of Griggs, which contains the seeds of the disparate treatment the-
ory of discrimination, was more fully developed in later cases such as McDon-
nell Douglas v. Green94 and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 95
It is based on the Court's construction of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.
96
In McDonnell Douglas a black plaintiff in a nonclass action case sought
relief under Title VII, alleging that he had been denied reemployment because
91. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 21, at 181, noting that validating a test in
accordance with the federal guidelines on employee selection, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1979), is ex-
tremely expensive at best, and in many cases economically prohibitive. A test under the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures is defined very broadly. Id § 1607.16(Q). See The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 49,233-34 (commenting on Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)). See generall, D. BALDUS & J. COLES, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DIs-
CRIMINATION (1980).
92. See generally Edwards, supra note 29.
93. 401 U.S. at 430-31.
94. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
95. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976).
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he had participated in civil rights demonstrations directed at his employer.
Plaintiff's qualifications for the job he sought were well established because he
had been previously employed by defendant in a similar position. The court
of appeals, following the broad construction that lower courts had given Title
VII after Griggs, held that the employer had the burden to demonstrate a'sub-
stantial relationship between the reason offered for rejecting plaintiff and the
requirements for the job.97 This standard flowed directly from Griggs, which
held that the defendant has the burden of showing business necessity after
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination. Thus, the burden
of persuasion was on the defendant to demonstrate that the adverse action was
based on business necessity, was carefully tailored to the precise demands of
the job, and did not involve any residual effects of systemic discrimination. In
addition to proving business necessity, the defendant, under the court of ap-
peals' reading of Griggs, had to show that the employment policy was applied
to all employees equally.98 This meant, for example, that if the employer
could prove that successful performance of the job demanded that emloyees
not have been convicted of any criminal offense, that standard would have to
be applied to all white applicants as well as to all black applicants.
The Court in McDonnell Douglas held that the court of appeals erred in
applying the Griggs theory of discrimination to the facts of the case:
The court below appeared to rely upon Griggs . . . in which the
Court stated: "If an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the prac-
tice is prohibited.". . . But Griggs differs from the instant case in
important respects. It dealt with standardized testing devices which,
however neutral on their face, operated to exclude many blacks who
were capable of performing effectively in the desired positions.
Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood difficiencies in the edu-
cation and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces be-
yond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and
invidious burden on such citizens for the remainder of their lives
.... [Plaintif], however, appears in different clothing. He had en-
gaged in a seriously disruptive act against the very one from whom
he now seeks employment. And defendant does not seek his exclu-
sion on the basis of a testing device which overstates what is neces-
sary for competent performance, or through some sweeping
disqualification of all those with any past record of unlawful behav-
ior, however remote, insubstantial, or unrelated to applicant's per-
sonal qualifications as an employee. [Defendant] assertedly rejected
[plaintiff] for unlawful conduct against it and, in the absence of proof
of pretext or discriminatory application of such a reason, this cannot
be thought the kind of "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers
to employment" which the Court found to be the intention of Con-
gress to remove .... 99
97. 463 F.2d 337, 344 (8th Cir. 1972).
98. See id at 346.
99. 411 U.S. at 805-06 (citations omitted).
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After distinguishing Griggs, the Court reiterated and emphasized its ruling in
Griggs that Congress did not intend to guarantee a job to every person regard-
less of qualification and that Title VII cannot be read to command that a per-
son be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination.l10
In an apparent attempt to reconcile the inconsistency in its rationale in Griggs,
namely its conclusion that Congress both proscribed discriminatory prefer-
ences for any group and also required the removal of artificial barriers to em-
ployment that operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race against a
class, the Court offered the following explanation:
There are societal as well as personal interests on both sides of
this equation. The broad, overriding interest, shared by the em-
ployer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy work-
manship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and
personnel decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it is
abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination,
subtle or otherwise. 10 1
The Court, apparently satisfied that no significant analytical relationship
existed between the two cases, read into Title VII the second theory of equal-
ity--equal treatment-based on a construction of section 703(a)(1) of Title
VII. Under the McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment theory of discrimina-
tion, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case under Title VII by showing
that (i) he belongs to a protected class, (ii) he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants, (iii) despite qualifications,
he was rejected, and (iv) after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants with plaintiffs qualifications.10 2 If
this showing is made, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to
the defendant to establish a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" 10 3 for
plaintiffs rejection. Assuming that the defendant meets this burden, the plain-
tiff then has the opportunity to show that the defendant's stated reason was
merely a pretext for prohibited discrimination.'1 4
The disparate treatment strand of Griggs came into full fruition in Mc-
Donnell Douglas and stands in sharp contrast to the Griggs disparate impact
theory. A showing of intentional discrimination is required under disparate
treatment; it is not required under disparate impact.105 The legitimate non-
100. Id at 800.
101. Id at 801. See notes 54-57 supra.
102. Id at 802.
103. Id
104. Id at 804.
105. In attempting to explain the difference between the disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment theories of discrimination, the Court in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977), stated:
"Disparate treatment" such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily under-
stood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Proof of discrim-
inatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere
fact of differences in treatment. ...Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most
obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII. See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec.
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discriminatory reason standard that a defendant must meet under disparate
13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("What the bill does... is simply to make it
an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment. It provides that men
and women shall be employed on the basis of their qualifications, not as Catholic citi-
zens, not as Protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as colored citizens, but as
citizens of the United States.").
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress "dispa-
rate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than an-
other and cannot be justified by business necessity... . Proof of discriminatory motive,
we have held, is not required under a disparate impact theory. Compare, e.g., Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-432, with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-806.... Either theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of
facts.
In 1976 the Supreme Court, by a sharply divided vote, ruled in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976), that the exclusion of pregnancy from the coverage of a private employer's
disability insurance program did not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. Perhaps the
most disturbing element of the decision, for both the concurring and dissenting members of the
Court, was the suggestion in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion that the Griggs Title VII theory
would be soon replaced by the more stringent substantive standard applicable in fourteenth
amendment equal protection cases.
Prior to Gilbert the Court, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), held that purposeful
discrimination is necessary to establish discrimination under the equal protection clause. The
Court specifically noted in Davis, however, that the constitutional standard does not extend to
Title VII. Id at 238-39. Accordingly, the Court reiterated that under the Title VII disparate
impact theory announced in Griggs a prima facie case of discrimination may be established by
proof that a facially neutral employment policy has a significantly disparate impact on a protected
class. Id
The possibility that the Griggs disparate impact theory might soon be replaced by the require-
ment that a Title VII plaintiff demonstrate not only a disparate impact but also a discriminatory
intent was raised in Gilbert because of the method of analysis adopted by Justice Rehnquist. In
examining plaintif's claim that exclusion of pregnancy from employer's disability insurance pro-
gram constituted unlawful sex discrimination, Justice Rehnquist first considered which subsection
of 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976), the general antidiscrimination provision of Title VII,
encompassed plaintiffs claim. 429 U.S. at 133. Subsection 703(a)(1) declares it to be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976). Subsection 703(a)(2) declares it to be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's... sex. ... Id
§ 2000e-2(a)(2). As the disability insurance program in Gilbert was essentially compensatory in
nature, and as § 703(a)(1) expressly prohibits discrimination with respect to compensation, Justice
Rehnquist determined that the legality of the program was to be determined according to the
standards established under § 703(a)(1). 429 U.S. at 130-40.
Having determined that § 703(a)(1) was the appropriate section under which to analyze the
disability insurance program, Justice Rehnquist next examined the standards governing the find-
ing of a Title VII violation. 429 U.S. at 133. In this regard, Justice Rehnquist noted that Congress
nowhere defined "discrimination" in Title VII and concluded that it was therefore appropriate to
look to fourteenth amendment decisions, which "afford an existing body of law analyzing and
discussing that term in a legal context not wholly dissimilar to the concerns which Congress mani-
fested in enacting Title VII." Id From this existing body of law, Justice Rehnquist drew upon
the Court's decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In Geduldig, the Court held that
the exclusion of pregnancy from the otherwise inclusive coverage of a disability insurance pro-
gram does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because such a
program does not discriminate on the basis of sex. Id at 496-97 & 496 n.20. The exclusion of
pregnancy does not constitute sex-based discrimination, the Geduldig Court reasoned, because
"[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women are not." Id at 496-97. Accordingly,
the Geduldig Court found the disability insurance program to be merely underinclusive, creating a
distinction not between men and women but between "pregnant women and nonpregnant per-
sons." Id at 496 n.20. Applying the constitutional analysis of Gedulh'g to the Title VII claim in
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treatment is minimal10 6 in comparison to the rigorous business necessity stan-
Gilbert, the Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion of pregnancy from General Electric's
disability program did not violate Title VII because, as in Geduldig, the program discriminated on
the basis of pregnancy rather than on the basis of sex.
Although application of Geduldig's constitutional analysis mandated a finding that the exclu-
sion of pregnancy from General Electric's disability insurance program did not constitute Title
VII sex-based discrimination, Justice Rehnquist recognized that the Court's decision in Griggs
required consideration of whether the program nevertheless had a discriminatory effect on women
in violation of Title VII. Justice Rehnquist noted in this regard that Griggs was decided under
§ 703(a)(2) which, unlike § 703(a)(1), does not contain the word "discriminate." Id at 137. Jus-
tice Rehnquist then implied that proof of discriminatory intent is required under § 703(a)(1), al-
though not under § 703(a)(2), and thus the disparate impact theory is unavailable under
§ 703(a)(1). 429 U.S. at 137. This question, whether the disparate impact theory is available
under § 703(a)(1), was not answered in Gilbert, however, since the Court ruled that plaintiff failed
to prove the disability insurance program was in fact worth more to men than to women and
therefore had a disparate impact in violation of the Griggs standard. Since the disability insur-
ance program neither classified employees on the basis of sex nor had a disparate impact on
female employees, the Court determined that no Title VII violation had been established. Id at
145-46.
Justice Rehnquist's reliance in Gilbert on the constitutional analysis of Geduldig to define sex
discrimination under Title VII raised the question whether in a future case the Court miht also
require proof of discriminatory intent in Title VII 703(a)(2) cases, thereby vitiating the disparate
impact theory announced in Griggs. The Gilbert Court's" willingness to apply the fourteenth
amendment definition of discrimination to a Title VII claim was, however, only the first indication
in Justice Rehnquist's opinion that the requirement of discriminatory intent would be incorpo-
rated into Title VII. The Gilbert Court's interpretation of Title VII itself also cast doubt on the
continued validity of the disparate impact theory, at least with respect to § 703(a)(1). Prior to
Gilbert, courts applied the same standard of proof regardless of whether the Title VII claim arose
under § 703(a)(1) or § 703(a)(2). Indeed, courts, including the Supreme Court, seldom identified
one subsection or the other as providing the basis for its decision. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 & n.14 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-31 & n.10 (1977);
Yuhas v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 498 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934
(1978); Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364,370 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977);
Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 248, 250 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971). In Gilbert,
however, Justice Rehnquist suggested that a different analytical approach applies depending on
whether a claim of discrimination is encompassed by § 703(a)(1) or by § 703(a)(2).
Although Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Gilbert raised serious questions about the future of
the disparate impact theory under Title VII, his reference to the requirement of intent as an essen-
tial element of a prima fade case under § 703(a)(2) was not joined by a majority of the Court.
Only three members, Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Powell, joined Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion in its entirety. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to
state that he did not read the opinion as questioning either the validity of Griggs or the importance
of discriminatory impact in Title VII cases. 429 U.S. at 146 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun wrote separately, dissenting from any inference in the opinion that discriminatory im-
pact may never be a controlling factor in a Title VII case or that Griggs is no longer good law. Id
at 146 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In separate dissenting opinions, Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, id at 146-60 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting), and Justice Stevens, Id at
160-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting), both stated their disagreement with the Court's use of constitu-
tional analysis in a Title VII case. Justice Brennan also expressed the view that "[n]otwithstanding
unexplained and inexplicable implications to the contrary in the majority opinion" it is estab-
lished that disparate impact establishes a prima fade case under either § 703(a)(1) or § 703(a)(2).
Id at 154-55. Although Justice Stevens objected to the Court's use of constitutional analysis, he,
did not specifically address the issue of § 703(a)(1), since he was of the opinion that the disability
insurance program discriminated on the basis of sex, and therefore should have been found per se
violative of Title VII. Id at 161-62. Thus, while Justice Rehnquist's Gilbert opinion seemed to
threaten seriously the future of the disparate impact theory, it is unclear whether he could ever
receive support from a majority of the Court. Congress subsequently amended Title VII to over-
rule Gilbert, Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-955, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-(k) (Supp. 111978), but much of the theoretical and analytical disagreement in Gilbert is,
arguably, reflected in Weber.
106. In McDonnell Douglas the Court held that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
[Vol. 59
1981] DISCRIMINATION AND AFFIRMATIVE A CTION 557
dard applicable under disparate impact. 10 7 The use of statistical evidence
"[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection." 411 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added). The burden of proof
problem has proven troublesome to the lower courts. First, the Court's use of the term "articu-
late" as opposed to "prove" could have implied that the defendant bears only a light burden after
a plain establishes a prima facie case. Second, the Court failed to indicate clearly whether a
defendant's evidence must show the existence of a single, nondiscriminatory justification or must
help negate the presence of any discriminatory motive. Some lower courts emphasized the Court's
choice of the word "articulate" instead of "prove." This choice, these courts reasoned, indicated
that the defendant need only come forward with some credible evidence of a legitimate nondis-
criminatory justification. See, eg., Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978); Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir.
1977). Other courts, however, were of the opinion that casting such a minimal burden of proof
upon defendant would make that burden meaningless. These courts adopted the position that in
order for defendant to prevail, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a nondis-
criminatory explanation supports his action. See, e.g., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1245 n.45
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977).
The Supreme Court addressed the burden of proof issue in two cases during its October 1977
Term. In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the Court begged the question by
using both terms in the operative paragraph:
When the prima facie case is understood in the light of the opinion in McDonnell
Douglas, it is apparent that the burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of
proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration. . . . To
dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, the
employer need only "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection."
Id at 577-78 (emphasis added). Arguably, the Court meant that the two terms were synonymous
and interchangeable. But the Court made it clear that this was not its meaning in the second case,
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam).
In Sweeney the Court tacitly recognized that its own earlier choice of words had created
confusion about the appropriate allocation of the burdens of proof. But it held that the citation to
McDonnell Douglas in Furnco emphasized that the employer need only "articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for [its action rather than] prove the absence of discriminatory
motive." Id at 24. The four dissenting Justices found no operative distinction between the words
"prove" and "articulate" because both terms involve the presentation of evidence or proof rather
than the mere allegation of nondiscriminatory purpose. Id at 28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Court attempted to clarify some of the confusion on the order and allocation of the
burdens of proof in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981). This
decision is limited to claims based upon the disparate treatment theory of discrimination and does
not purport to consider the burden of proof problem in cases involving disparate impact.
107. Almost uniformly the courts have held that the business necessity defense of Griggs is not
satisfied simply by showing that an employment practice serves some legitimate business purpose.
Typical of the lower courts' statement of this defense is Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791
(4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971):
[1The applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for adhering
to a challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate busi-
ness purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the
business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any ra-
cial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the businesspurpose it is
alleged to serve; and there must be no available acceptable alternativepolicies orpractices
which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally
well with a lesser differential racial impact.
Id at 798 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). Other courts have used similar formulations.
E.., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2nd Cir. 1971) (necessity con-
notes an irresistible demand).
But see New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), in which the New York
City Transit Authority refused to hire methadone users for any position. Plaintiffs, alleging that
defendant's exclusion had a Griggs disparate impact on blacks and Hispanics, conceded that the
goals of safety and efficiency required the exclusion of all methadone users from "safety sensitive"
jobs, and of a majority of users from all jobs, but that there was a category of jobs to which the
exclusion did not meet the Griggs business necessity standard. The Supreme Court disagreed,
noting that "[t]hose goals are significantly served by-even if they do not require-defendant's]
NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW
alone may establish a prima facie case of a violation under disparate im-
pact.108 It is doubtful, however, that statistics alone could accomplish the
same result under disparate treatment. 1°9 Perhaps the most fundamental dif-
ference between the two theories is that disparate treatment is seen as an obli-
gation to focus on fairness to the individual rather than on fairness to the
group. 1
0
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. "'the Court again
faced the problem of reconciling the primary purpose of Title VII with either
the equal treatment concept or the equal opportunity concept of equality.
Two white employees had been terminated after being charged with theft. A
black employee charged with the same offense was retained. The white em-
ployees sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.112 Notwithstanding that
the Court, relying on the legislative history, had earlier noted that the primary
purpose of Title VII was to provide a remedy for blacks, it relied upon the
same legislative history to hold in McDonald that Title VII bars all racial dis-
crimination-against whites as well as blacks and other disadvantaged
groups.113 The disparate treatment strand of Griggs was again emphasized in
McDonald:
Thus, although we were not there confronted with racial discrimina-
tion against whites, we described the Act in Griggs.. .as prohibit-
ing "[d]iscriminatory preference for any [racial] group, minority or
majority."
We. . .hold today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination
against the white petitioner in this case upon the same standards as
would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson whites."t 4
The Court noted that it need not consider whether the result would have been
different if the action taken by the employer had been done in the context of
an affirmative action program."Is
The importance of McDonnell Douglas and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trails
rule as it applies to all methodone users including those who are seeking employment in non-
safety sensitive positions .... The record thus demonstrates that [defendant's] rule bears a 'man-
ifest relationship to the employment in question"' as required by Grngr. Id at 587 n.31. Thus
the Court held that even assuming plaintiffs statistics made out a prima facie case of disparate
impact, the showing of job relatedness protected defendant from liability. While Beazer seemed
to apply a more lenient business necessity standard than has been applied by the lower courts, it
did not make explicit the parameters of the defense. Hence, it is now unclear how the lower courts
will treat Beazer.
108. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-31 (1977); Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
109. See, eg., King v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 523 F.2d 879, 882 (8th Cir. 1975); Terrell v.
Feldstern Co., 468 F.2d 910, 911 (5th Cir. 1972). But see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 153 n.6 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. See generally Fiss, supra note 28, at 107; Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World-
Equalilyfor the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rav. 363 (1966).
111. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
113. 427 U.S. at 80.
114. Id at 279 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
115. Id at 280 n.8.
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is that the Court impliedly rejected the notion that discrimination under Title
VII is a unitary concept that must embrace either the equal treatment concep-
tion or the equal opportunity conception. Both views now had been read into
Title VII, notwithstanding the conflict in the outcome that both have for the
implementation of race-conscious affirmative action. 116 The McDonnell Doug-
las/McDonald v. Santa Fe Trails disparate treatment theory and the portion of
Griggs stating that Congress did not guarantee a job to everyone simply be-
cause he was subject to prior discrimination 1 7 became the doctrinal founda-
tion for the Court's shift in emphasis from the equal opportunity conception of
equality to the equal treatment conception. This development was predicated
on a construction of Title VII that emphasizes fairness to the individual rather
than to a group and on the establishment of rigorous standards to establish a
prima facie case under the Griggs disparate impact theory and correspond-
ingly more lenient standards to rebut a prima facie case under the disparate
treatment theory. "s
In Teamsters v. United States'1 the Court held, in a case in which plain-
tiff relied only upon the disparate treatment theory, that although treatment of
a group is permissible as an evidentiary tool to establish liability,'20 Title VII,
as a remedial device, must be interpreted as requiring fairness to individuals
and not groups.' 2 ' The district court in Teamsters, after finding that defend-
ant's seniority system had unlawfully prevented plaintiff's class from transfer-
ring to more desirable jobs within the company, ordered that the identifiable
victims of unlawful discrimination receive retroactive seniority and priority in
job placement.' 22 The court of appeals adjusted the district court's remedy
116. See note 39 supra; Fiss, supra note 33. Compare, e.g., Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note
13, with Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CH.
L. Rnv. 775, 784-85 (1979) (suggesting that the Court has been consistent in the theory of equality
read into Title VII).
117. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
118. See notes 106 & 107 supra. Compare, eg., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568 (1979) and Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), with Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam).
119. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
120. Id at 339-40 & 339 n.20.
121. Rejecting the government's argument that the entire class was entitled to relief, the Court
stated:
Although not directly controlled by the Act, the extent to which the legitimate ex-
pectations of nonvictim employees should determine when victims are restored to their
rightful place is limited by basic principles of equity. In devising and implementing
remedies under Title VII, no less than in formulating any equitable decree, a court must
draw on the "qualities of mercy and practicality [that] have made equity the instrument
for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as
well as between competing private claims." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-330.
Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRBI, 313 U.S., at 195-196, modifying, 113 F.2d 202 (CA2);
19 N.L.R.B. 547, 600; Franks, 424 U.S., at 798-799 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Especially when immediate implementation of an equitable remedy
threatens to impinge upon the expectations of innocent parties, the courts must "look to
the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing in-
terests," in order to determine the "special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and
what is workable." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192,200-201, (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
Id at 374-75.
122. Id at 330-32.
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and extended the remedy to a group of blacks who were not shown to have
actually suffered specific discrimination at the hands of the employer.123 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that only identifiable black victims, that is
blacks who could show that they had applied for a transfer or who would have
applied but for the company's unlawful practices, were entitled to relief. Title
VII, the Court held, protects only individuals and not all of the company's
minority employees or applicants as a class.'
24
The Court's most direct treatment of the individual versus group discrimi-
nation is found in City of Los Angeles v. Manhart.125 Manhart was a class
action challenging the pension plan of one of the city's departments. The plan
required female employees to make larger contributions than male employees.
The basis for the differential was the unchallenged actuarial fact that the fe-
male employees would live a few years longer than the males. Since the
monthly pension payments were the same for each sex, the cost of a pension
was greater for female retirees than for male retirees. The Court stated the
issue as "whether the existence or nonexistence of 'discrimination' is to be de-
termined by comparison of class characteristics or individual characteris-
tics."1' 26 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated unambigously that Title
VII prohibits discrimination "against any individual.., because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 27 Under the Manhart
rationale even an accurate generalization about a group cannot be used
against an individual whom it does not fit; each person must be treated as an
individual, not as a member of a group. As Justice Stevens went on to state,
the "basic policy" of Title VII is "fairness to the individuals rather than fair-
ness to classes."'
128
3. Group vs. Individual Fairness: The Conflict Crystallizes
Beginning in the mid-1970's, and coinciding with the onset of recession-
ary times, employers who had adopted race-conscious affirmative action pro-
grams were increasingly confronted with claims of reverse discrimination by
white males. The increase in the number of reverse discrimination claims was
not sudden. During the first decade of Title VII, there had been scattered
challenges by white males to the special emphasis placed on recruitment, hir-
ing, and promotion of blacks under affirmative action programs. Few of these
earlier challenges elicited either judicial sympathy or substantial relief. 129 The
123. Id at 333-34.
124. Id at 368-69 & 368 n.52.
125. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
126. Id at 708.
127. Id at 708 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976)) (emphasis in original).
128. Id at 709.
129. See, eg., Rios v. Steamfitters, Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) (action under § 1981
and Title VII by union applicants in which the Court upheld a quota for union membership);
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1971) (class action under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 by fire department employees in which the Court sanctioned a temporary hiring
quota of one minority person for every two nonminority persons); O'Burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 549
(E.D. Pa. 1976)) (private action under Title VII by police department applicants in which the
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conflict between the two concepts of equality began to take on a more struc-
tured form after the Supreme Court decided McDonnell Douglas v. Green in
1973.
Race-conscious remedies were first challenged when courts began to
adopt hiring and promotion quotas to remedy past discrimination. Many
courts approved quotas despite the arguments asserted on behalf of whites
who claimed to be innocent victims of reverse discrimination. Judicial justifi-
cation for quotas was that they were necessary to remedy clear-cut patterns of
past discrimination. 130 Finding themselves unable to fashion more appropri-
ate forms of relief, the courts relied upon quotas as a remedy.13 1 The Griggs
disparate impact theory was critical to this development.
Although the authority of the federal courts to order race-conscious reme-
dies had been widely accepted, no uniform standards had been established to
determine when quotas were appropriate. For example, in Carter v. Gal-
lagher,132 the court expressed its hesitation with respect to the imposition of
absolute quotas, noting that
[t]he absolute preference ordered by the trial court would operate as
a present infringement on those non-minority group persons who are
equally or superiorly qualified for the fire fighter's positions; and we
hesitate to advocate implementation of one constitutional guarantee
district court refused to allow collateral attack on a consent decree which allegedly caused reverse
discrimination); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 384 F. Supp. 585 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), a f'd, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975) (consolidated actions under Title VII by minority newspa-
per and publications delivery employees in which the Court approved a settlement which pro-
vided for aggressive affirmative action and a 25% minority employment goal). See Comment, The
Myth ofReverse Race Discrimination: A Historical Perspective, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 319 (1974).
For collections of the cases which have addressed the appropriateness and scope of preferential
relief, see 1974-75 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 965 (1975).
One case that brought analogous issues to national attention was DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82
Wash. 2d 11,507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacatedper curiam as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). DeFunis was
a white male whose application to the University of Washington School of Law was rejected
pursuant to an admissions procedure which, while not employing quotas, did consider the race
and ethnic background of applicants who chose to indicate those characteristics on the application
form. DeFunis filed suit charging that his fourteenth amendment equal protection rights had been
violated when the school accepted 36 minority applicants whose past scholastic performance indi-
cated that they were less qualified than himself. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the trial
court's ruling that consideration of race by the school was per se unconstitutional. Instead, the
court required defendant to prove that consideration of the race of its applicants was "necessary to
the accomplishment ofa compelling state interest." Id at 33, 507 P.2d at 1182. Compelling inter-
ests were found in the state's desire to (1) promote integration; (2) produce a racially balanced law
school student body; and (3) correct the shortage of minority members admitted to the bar. The
school's consideration of racial characteristics was found to be necessary because less restrictive
alternatives such as improving primary and secondary education in the state would not be able to
correct the problem of underrepresentation in the foreseeable future. However, by the time plain-
tifrs case was argued in the United States Surpeme Court, he had already been admitted to the
law school pursuant to the trial court's order and had registered for his final semester. Accord-
ingly, the suit was dismissed as moot by the Supreme Court. 416 U.S. at 317.
130. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1971);
Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1286 (3d Cir. 1972).
131. For an exhaustive history of some of the earlier cases on quotas, see Slate, Preferential
Relief in Employment Discrimination Cases, 5 Loy. CM L.J. 315 (1974).
132. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1971).
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by the outright denial of another. 133
Other courts expressed similar concerns. 134 Despite these reservations, and
the continuing debate on the appropriateness of quotas, courts generally re-
fused to declare the use of quotas impermissible, 135 and they were approved in
the majority of cases in which such relief was proposed.
136
133. Id at 330. The Carter court eventually approved a hiring quota of one minority person
for every two nonminority persons. Id at 331.
134. Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973), is an excellent example of a
court's uncertainty about the scope and use of quota relief. In evaluating district court quotas for
police hiring and promotion, the Third Circuit first rejected quotas for hiring and promotion.
Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6600, 6601 (3d Cir. 1972). "Opening the doors long
shut to minorities is imperative, but in so doing, we must be careful not to close them on the face
of others, lest we abandon the basic principle of non-discrimination that sparked efforts to pry
open those doors in the first place." Id On rehearing, however, the same court again rejected
promotional quotas, but affirmed the hiring procedures including the quota provisions because the
court was "equally divided" with respect to those provisions. 473 F.2d 1029, 1030 (3d Cir. 1973).
135. See, e.g., Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975);
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th
Cir. 1974); Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 478 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
136. In the years following the enactment of Title VII, the courts and federal executive agen-
cies reasoned that Congress had not intended to outlaw one of the most effective means of reme-
dying past discrimination. Accordingly, the courts interpreted Title VII to permit, and in some
instances to require, the use of race-conscious numerical remedies. The courts held that § 703(j),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976), could not be construed as a ban on quotas: "Any other interpreta-
tions would allow complete nullification of the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
Title VII was held to authorize remedial orders requiring union referrals of one black worker for
each white worker, Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1055 (5th Cir. 1969), and
specific percentages of blacks in regular apprenticeship classes and special apprenticeship pro-
grams for blacks only, United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1247-48 (W.D.
Wash. 1970), aft'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v.
Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 133 (8th Cir. 1969). As the Second Circuit stated in
summarizing these decisions, "while quotas merely to attain racial balance are forbidden, quotas
to correct past discriminatory practices are not." United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471
F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
The courts of appeals in cases from the following seven circuits upheld the authority of the
district courts to order race-conscious numerical relief under Title VII or other federal fair em-
ployment laws: Boston Chapter, N.A.A.C.P., Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 361 F. Supp.
1293 (D. Mass), ai'd, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 991 (1975); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973);
Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974); N.A.A.C.P. v. Allen, 493
F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 895 (1974); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other
grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n, 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir.
1974); United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); Sims v. Local 65, Sheet
Metal Workers, 489 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1978); Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976);
Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. N.L. Indus.,
Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
Also, during the period between the enactment of Title VII in 1964 and its amendment in
1972, the Department of Labor determined that numerical goals and timetables were necessary to
implement the equal employment opportunity and affirmative action obligations of government
contractors under Executive Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), and that a
permissible method of meeting the goals and timetables in the construction industry was the hiring
of one minority craftsman for each nonminority craftsman. See Comment, The Philadephia Plan:
A Study in the Dynamics oExecutive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 723, 739-43 (1972). Both the
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The rationale supporting quotas began to receive closer scrutiny from the
courts as employers and unions attempted to comply with court orders and
federal affirmative action regulations 137 requiring increased employment op-
portunities for blacks. As the number of challenges to those actions increased,
the courts began to show greater reluctance to approve preferential treatment
of blacks or to impose quota remedies. This reluctance was clearly evidenced
by a spate of decisions in 1975 and 1976. Several of these decisions illustrate
the doctrinal retreat from Griggs as the rationale of McDonnell Douglas v.
Green and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trails Transportation Co. became more
dominant.
One of the most notable decisions, which partially denied quota relief
because of the effects upon white male employees, was Kirkland v. New York
Department of Justice, 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 37 (Sept. 22, 1969), and the Department of Labor, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, LEGAL MEMORANDUM, in Hearings on the Philadelphia Plan and S. 931 Before
the Subcomam on Separation of Powers of the Senate Coma on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
255, 274 (1969), found no conflict between the race-conscious measures and the provisions of Title
VII. But see 49 Comp. Gen. 59 (1969). The courts agreed, holding that § 7030) did not impose
any limitation on actions taken pursuant to the Executive Order program and that
[t]o read § 703(a) in the manner suggested by the plaintiffs, we would have to attri-
bute to Congress the intention to freeze the status quo and to foreclose remedial action
under other authority designed to overcome existing evils. We discern no such intention
either from the language of the statute or from its legislative history.
Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971). See also Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 684-86 (7th Cir. 1972).
Thus, by the time Congress considered the 1972 amendments to Title VII, it was well established
that the 1964 Act permitted race-conscious remedial action.
Although the majority of courts concluded that § 703(j) does not preclude all forms of prefer-
ential treatment, dissenting views were expressed. For example, Judge Hays, in dissent in Rios v.
Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 634 (2d Cir. 1974), argued that § 7030)
expressly prohibits racial quotas or "goals" even if they are imposed to eliminate past discrimina-
tory practices. Simply stated, Judge Hays argued that § 7030) was placed specifically in Title VII
to remove all racial employment quotas from the panoply of equitable remedies available to the
district courts. He sought to support his analysis by relying upon the legislative history of§ 703(j),
which included a statement from Senator Humphrey, one of the drafters of § 703(j), clarifying the
section's purpose:
The proponents of this bill have carefully stated on numerous occassions that Title VII
does not require an employer to achieve any sort of racial balance in his work force by
giving preferential treatment to any individual or group.
110 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
Judge Hays, contrary to the approach taken by a majority of the courts, further suggested that
§ 703(j), being a specific delegation of power, should control the general remedial provision,
§ 706(g). 501 F.2d at 637 (Hays, J., dissenting). Under this reasoning, § 703() would limit any
preferential treatment program under § 706(g), without limiting a number of other affirmative
remedies available to the courts to meet the purpose of Title VII. Id Finally, the Rios issen
suggests that remedial quotas do violence to Title VIrs purpose of ending racism because the
approval of racial classifications exacerbates racial attitudes. Id at 639.
A related analysis is found in United States v. International Ass'n of Operating Eng'rs
(IUOE), Local 701, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1400 (D. Ore. 1977). In that case, even though
statistical evidence demonstrated that the union had engaged in racial discrimination, the court
refused to grant a remedy that would have required the local to refer minority workers to contrac-
tors on federally funded construction projects "without regard to the minority workers position on
[the Union's] hiring hall lists." Id at 1407. Relying on § 703(j), the court held that "[t]he remedy
sought by the United States would be a blatant giving of preferential treatment to minorities in the
union over nonminorities." Id at 1408.
137. See, ag, 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1977).
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State Department of Correctional Services.' 38 In Kirkland two black correc-
tional officers brought suit to enjoin promotions based upon an allegedly dis-
criminatory promotional examination. The test was held to be racially
discriminatory and unlawful, a finding upheld by the court of appeals. The
district court, however, had ordered the establishment of a fixed racial quota
for promotions.' 39 The court of appeals struck down the quota requirement
because it was viewed as a permanent rather than a temporary requirement.
140
Although the court of appeals recognized that quotas are appropriate in some
instances, it refused to permit their use (1) absent a showing of a clear-cut
pattern and egregious history of racial discrimination and (2) the proposed
quota would have an immediate impact upon a small number of easily identi-
fiable white males. 141 Yet, the court sanctioned the use of interim quotas as a
justifiable remedy when the impact of the remedy would be dispersed among a
group of whites whose members could not be individually identified in ad-
vance.1
42
In a decision issued shortly before McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transpor-
tation Co. 143 the district court in Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univer-
sity,144 without ruling on the legality of all preferential relief, considered
whether a race- and sex-conscious affirmative action plan could excuse prefer-
ential treatment in employment decision-making. The university had actively
recruited women for faculty positions to compensate for alleged past sex dis-
crimination in hiring. The male plaintiff had been denied two different posi-
tions for which he was at least as well or better qualified than the two female
applicants who were hired. The male applicant claimed the practice of prefer-
ential hiring, pursuant to the university's affirmative action plan, was unlawful
reverse discrimination. The university asserted that its policy of considering
qualified female candidates to the exclusion of qualified males was not in vio-
lation of the equal protection clause 145 because it was rationally related to the
university's obligation to conform to federal and state affirmative action re-
quirements. 46 Further, the university argued that the prohibitions against
preferential hiring and quotas contained in Title VII were overridden by the
138. 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
139. The district court ordered that: (1) a lawful, nondiscriminatory selection procedure be
established; (2) one out of every four interim appointments be filled by a minority, subject to court
approval; and (3) defendants continue to promote at least one black or Hispanic employee for
each three white employees until the percentage of minority sergeants equals the percentage of
minority correctional officers. Id at 423.
140. Id at 428.
141. Id at 427-30.
142. Id at 429-30. See also Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976)
(upholding nonpreferential elements of the district court's affirmative action order but reversing
that part of the order that required the employer to combine seniority rosters at his two plants and
to "bump" white workers); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing
a district court order quota "excessing" plan for teachers because of its nonremedial, racially.
based distortion of the seniority system).
143. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
144. 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated, 586 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1978).
145. Id at 676-78.
146. Id at 677.
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implied obligation under Executive Order 11,246 to afford preferences to mi-
norities and women. 147
The court in Cramer recognized the inherent conflict between implemen-
tation of the affirmative action plan and completely neutral hiring practices
that have an adverse impact on protected classes. Finding, however, that Title
VII prohibits such preferences and that Executive Order 11,246 does not ne-
gate the prohibition against preferential treatment, the court ruled against any
use of race or sex as a criterion for hiring under any circumstances, although it
accepted as a fact the past discrimination against women. 148 In finding affirm-
ative action practices that afford preferential treatment to blacks and females
unlawful, the court insisted that the same injustices to which affirmative action
programs were addressed would be forever perpetuated if preferential treat-
ment were given on the basis of race and sex. 149
A case that caused considerable consternation among employers and un-
ions was MeAleer v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. ,150 in which the
court approved an award of damages to a white male employee who had been
passed over for a promotion. The plaintiff concededly was entitled to the pro-
motion under the collective bargaining agreement, but the position had been
given instead to a less senior female employee pursuant to an affirmative ac-
tion consent decree negotiated between AT&T and the EEOC under the aus-
pices of a federal district court in another district. 151 The decree had specified
that if two applicants for a position have substantially equal qualifications, the
position, under the "affirmative action override" provision in the plan, must be
offered to the one with the superior seniority. If stated affirmative action em-
ployment goals were not met, however, the decree required that, as between
persons possessing the same basic qualifications, the employer must choose the
minority or female person.1
52
The court in McAleer interpreted Title VII as placing the burden of past
discrimination on the guilty employer (or union) and thus believed that, when-
ever possible, the innocent employee should not bear any of the costs of un-
lawful discrimination. The court rejected the defense that AT&T's action was
required by a previous court order, reasoning that the prior order was necessi-
tated by AT&T's own wrongful conduct and thus the company's actions were
not protected. The court held that although the employer was legally obli-
gated to comply with the affirmative action consent decree, it also had to com-
pensate innocent white employees who were adversely affected by the
affirmative action plan. The court recognized that competitive status job bene-
fits such as promotions, transfers, and order of layoffs and recalls could be
withheld from incumbent employees, but held that the employer had to pay
147. Id at 680.
148. Id at 678-80.
149. Id at 681.
150. 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976).
151. Id at 436.
152. Id at 436-37.
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for the loss of those benefits.
15 3
Although there was some authority indicating that employment decisions
taken pursuant to a court order were protected from a claim of reverse dis-
crimination,' 5 4 the court in MeAleer chose instead to rely upon the "innocent
employee" rationale of Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. 155 McAf4leer is
not inconsistent with Franks. In Franks black applicants for over-the-road
driving jobs brought an action against defendants for alleged violations of Ti-
tle VII. The district court found that the rejected black applicants had been
victims of unlawful racial discrimination but refused to grant seniority retroac-
tive to the date of their application. The Supreme Court reversed that aspect
of the case and ruled that an award of retroactive seniority, like back pay, is
presumptively necessary to make whole the victims of past discrimination.
156
The Court held that the seniority status serves to place the victims in their
"rightful place."' 57 The majority, in response to a dissent by Justices Powell
and Rehnquist, reasoned that any adverse effect upon innocent white employ-
153. Id at 440.
154. See, e.g., Black & White Children of Pontiac School Sys. v. School Dist., 464 F.2d 1030
(6th Cir. 1972); O'Burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
155. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The issue in Franks was whether § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976), which excludes bona fide seniority systems from coverage under the Act, precludes an
award of retroactive seniority to identifiable victims of discrimination. The Court held that a
grant of retroactive seniority under the circumstances was consistent with that provision of Title
VII, with its legislative history, and with the "make whole" objectives of the Act. Id at 758, 763-
64. The Court also noted that the benefits accruing from advanced seniority are as important to
incumbent employees as they would be to nonemployee applicants. In addressing the company's
argument that an award of retroactive seniority would impinge on the expectancies of "innocent
employees," the Court stated:
[I]t is apparent that denial of seniority relief to identifiable victims of racial discrimi-
nation on the sole ground that such relief diminishes the expectations of other, arguably
innocent, employees would if applied generally frustrate the central "make whole" ob-
jective of Title VII. These conflicting interests of other employees will, of course, always
be present in instances where some scarce employment benefit is distributed among em-
ployees on the basis of their status in the seniority heirarchy. But, as we have said, there
is nothing in the language of Title VII, or in its legislative history, to show that Congress
intended generally to bar this form of relief to victims of illegal discrimination, and the
experience under the remedial model in the National Labor Relations Act points to the
contrary. Accordingly, we find untenable the conclusion that this form of relief may be
denied merely because the interests of other employees may thereby be affected.
Id at 774-75.
The dissent emphasized that the grant of retroactive seniority to post-Act discriminatees
would impact heavily on other "innocent" employees instead of the employer responsible for the
unlawful discrimination. Id at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., and Powell, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Burger indicated a preference for awarding monetary damages rather than competitive seniority
to the discriminatees, reasoning that pursuing this remedy would tend to deter the employer from
engaging in further discrimination while holding harmless other employees. Id at 780-81. In
response to the dissenters' criticism that the creation of a presumption favoring retroactive senior-
ity would unnecessarily harm "perfectly innocent employees," id at 788, the majority stated that
"the result [reached today]-which, standing alone, establishes that a sharing of the burden of the
past discrimination is presumptively necessary-is entirely consistent with any fair characteriza-
tion of equity jurisdiction .. " Id at 777. In a footnote to that last sentence, the majority
opinion suggests the award of monetary damages to each incumbent employee and discriminatee
as a possible remedy available to district courts. This suggestion was followed by a disavowal of
any views regarding the use of such a remedy since the issue was not properly before the Court.
Id at 777 n.38.
156. Id at 774.
157. Id at 764 n.21.
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ees simply must be tolerated to achieve racial equality: "If relief under Title
VII can be denied merely because the majority group of employees, who have
not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it, there is little hope of
correcting the wrongs to which the Act was directed."' 5 8 In support of this,
the Court noted that regardless of the relief, the discriminatee continues to
bear some of the burdens of past discrimination. The Court was careful to
point out other remedial action that might be used to balance the interests of
the black victims and innocent white employees: a "hold harmless" injunctive
order respecting all affected employees in a layoff; front pay in favor of each
employee and discriminatee; and union liability when the union has partici-
pated in the unlawful conduct. The Court, however, expressly refrained from
ruling on these issues. 159 Chief Justice Burger, concurring and dissenting in
part, stressed, however, that a more equitable remedy would be to provide
front pay to the affected black employees. Justice Burger stated that he could
not agree with the Court's approach, which he described as "robbing Peter to
pay Paul,"' 60 because of its impact on innocent white employees. He also
stressed that innocent white employees were not foreclosed from suing the em-
ployer because of a remedy that benefited blacks.161
The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Burger in Franks can be read as
an invitation to white employees to bring reverse discrimination claims under
Title VII. In McAleer the court recognized that invitation when it held that
the plaintiff was entitled to the benefits of the seniority position he held imme-
diately prior to remedial efforts. Consequently, after a race-conscious remedy
is invoked and a minority employee is awarded the position, the employer is
still required to provide the benefits of that position to the affected innocent
white employee. In sum, McAleer held that two different employees-one fe-
male, and the other male-had valid Title VII claims to the benefits of the
same position. The effect on the employer was apparent: having once dis-
criminated in the past, he became potentially liable for two salaries for the
same position, at least until the incumbent vacated the position.
Thus, at the time the Supreme Court heard Weber, it had recognized two
conflicting theories of discrimination under Title VII. One, disparate impact,
designed to increase minority representation in the work force, supported the
affirmative action concept. The other, disparate treatment, designed to elimi-
nate any consideration of race in decision-making, supported the reverse dis-
crimination claims. This conflict reflected the two conceptions of equality that
the Court had read into Title VII.
The concern with protecting an individual's right to equal treatment is
arguably a concern with process. The concern with equality of opportunity,
on the other hand, is a concern with the position of groups relative to other
158. Id at 775 (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir.
1971)).
159. Id at 777 n.38.
160. Id at 781 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
161. Id
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groups-a concern with outcomes.162 While process and outcome are rela-
tively easy to separate in theory, they are more difficult to disentangle in prac-
tice. Given the current state of knowledge, statistics about outcomes remain
the most expedient and feasible indicator of process, at least in the area of
employment. In other words, the attention given to outcomes does not reflect
a change in the ultimate objective, but rather points to the difficulty of ob-
taining an operational indicator of process. It thus appears that those who
reject affirmative action because of philosophical reasons are unable to suggest
a better way to measure change in treatment. For example, Professor Glazer,
in his chapter addressed to racial discrimination, resorts to using indicators of
outcomes to support his contention that blacks advanced further prior to the
enactment of Title VII than subsequent to it.1 63 In an attempt to refute the
existence of "institutional racism," Glazer contends that the argument that it
exists "became institutionalized and strengthened at a time when very substan-
tial progress had been made, and was being made, in the upgrading of black
employment and income.'"164 His proof of these improvements is found in the
distribution of black families by income levels and the distribution of blacks
by occupation. These are the same types of statistics used by the courts to
determine the existence of discrimination.
The real significance of the legal developments prior to Weber was that it
created a dilemma in the enforcement of the national policy against employ-
ment discrimination. Many employers were faced with disproportionate work
force populations, and the OFCC, EEOC, and numerous civil rights groups, to
say nothing of individual victims, were pressing for changes in the minority
profile in the work force. The affirmative action plan at issue in Weber had
been negotiated in 1974 when the Griggs disparate impact theory was the
dominant theme of the national policy. Weber was decided by the lower
courts, however, at the time when there was clearly a discernable shift to the
disparate treatment theory of discrimination with its emphasis on fairness to
individuals.
III. WEBER V KAISER A4LUMINUM & CHEMICA4L CO,".
A. The Factual Background
165
Kaiser Aluminum operated a plant in Gramercy, Louisiana. All produc-
tion and maintenance employees at that facility were represented by the Steel-
workers Union. As of 1974 the total population in the Gramercy area was
approximately forty-six percent black and the local work force was thirty-nine
percent black, yet blacks constituted less than two percent of the craft employ-
ees (five of the approximately 273 positions) and made up only 14.8% of Kai-
162. See Fiss, supra note 33, at 237-38.
163. N. GLAZER, supra note 20, at 41-43, 69.
164. Id at 69.
165. The basic facts are taken from the petitions for a writ of certiorari in United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and the lower court opinions, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977) and 415
F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
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ser's work force as a whole. The significant statistical disparity between the
percentages of blacks in the Gramercy area work force and the craft positions
had not occurred by chance. The primary method of gaining craft experience
in the Gramercy area was to enroll in training and apprenticeship programs
administered by the local building trades industry. Blacks, however, had not
enjoyed the same training opportunities as whites because the building trades
unions had historically discriminated against blacks and denied them admis-
sion to the training programs.'
66
Kaiser realized that there was a severe underrepresentation of blacks in
its craft jobs and feared that this underrepresentation, which was in apparent
violation of its affirmative action obligation as a government contractor under
Executive Order 11,246,167 would lead to the imposition of federal sanctions.
In addition, both Kaiser and the Steelworkers feared possible Title VII actions
brought by either black employees or the EEOC alleging discrimination in
craft employment under the Griggs disparate impact theory.
168
In response to these fears of private litigation or federal enforcement pro-
ceedings, Kaiser and the Steelworkers, on February 1, 1974, entered into a
nationwide collective-bargaining agreement that contained provisions
designed to increase the representation of blacks and women in the crafts and
maintenance positions. The collective-bargaining agreement provided for af-
firmative action goals and timetables and established a selection ratio of one
minority worker for each white employee chosen for future craft vacancies,
unless at a particular time there were insufficient qualified minority candidates
available. That selection ratio would be maintained at each Kaiser plant until
the minority representation in the craft jobs was equivalent to the percentages
of blacks in the work force from which the particular plant recruited.' 69
Kaiser and the Steelworkers, subsequent to the conclusion of the national
agreement, entered into a "Memorandum of Understanding," which set forth
a goal of thirty-nine percent of minority representation in craft positions at the
Gramercy plant. To ensure the success of this affirmative action program in
light of the scarcity of minorities with prior craft experience, the agreement
also provided for the establishment of new on-the-job training programs for
which prior experience would not be a prerequisite. The collective-bargaining
agreement also established a dual seniority selection ratio under which minor-
ity and female employees would be admitted to craft training programs with
less plant seniority than their white counterparts.
70
Brian Weber, a white employee at the Gramercy plant, was passed over
for one of the training programs in favor of a less senior black employee.
Weber brought a class action on behalf of all nonminority employees at the
166. For a discussion of discrimination against blacks in the unions, see generally H. HILL,
BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1977); L. KESSELMAN, THE SOCIAL POLITICS
OF FEPC (1948); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EMPLOYMENT 127-51 (1961).
167. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation).
168. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1977).
169. Id at 218.
170. Id at 222-23.
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Gramercy plant who had applied for, or were eligible to apply for, on-the-job
training programs set up pursuant to the 1974 collective-bargaining agree-
ment. His complaint alleged that by granting preferential treatment to blacks
who had not been shown to be victims of past discrimination, both Kaiser and
the Steelworkers violated his rights under sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII.
Defendants opposed Weber's claim on essentially four grounds. First, defend-
ants argued that they had not violated their duty of fair representation in ne-
gotiating the collective-bargaining agreement.17' Second, they argued that the
quota provision did not violate section 703(j), the antipreferential section of
Title VII, because the language of this section did not include a specific prohi-
bition against quotas in employment or training programs.' 72 Third, defend-
ants contended that the quota provision was analogous to affirmative action
programs that had been mandated by federal courts in response to lawsuits
brought by blacks under Title VII. 173 Finally, they argued that the provision
was adopted pursuant to its obligation as a government contractor under Ex-
ecutive Order 11,246.174 Defendant's arguments were fully supported by the
"state of the law"' 75 at the time the the agreement was negotiated.
B. The District Court Opinion
The district court agreed with Weber's allegations and issued a permanent
injunction against further use of the quotas at the Gramercy plant.' 76 The
court ruled that the race-conscious affirmative action provisions unlawfully
discriminated against white employees on the basis of race. 177 The court held
that sections 703(a)(1) and (d) expressly proscribe any employment practice
that discriminates against any individual on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. The court did not consider the potential applicability
of section 703(a)(2) under which Griggs was decided, nor how the theories,
based on these two sections, could be reconciled.
The court recognized that district courts may lawfully impose race-con-
scious remedies on employers pursuant to the broad remedial powers under
section 706(g). While acknowledging that a district court under Moody may
require an employer to grant preferential treatment to a victim of discrimina-
tion to make that employee "whole" and restore him to the position that he
would have had "but for" the employer's discrimination, the district court held
that only the judiciary possessed those powers and that an employer and union
could not voluntarily adopt such remedies.' 78 The court thus impliedly re-
171. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 765 (E.D. La. 1976).
172. Id at 766.
173. Id
174. Id at 764-65, 769.
175. See generally Belton, supra note 45.
176. 415 F. Supp. at 770.
177. Id at 766.
178. Id at 767. "The most important and obvious distinction is the fact that Sections 703(a)
and (d) of Title VII do not prohibit the courts from discriminating against individual employees
by establishing quota systems where appropriate. The proscriptions of the statute are directed
solely to employers." Id (emphasis added). The district court gave two additional reasons for
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jected persuasive precedents from its own court of appeals.179
The distinction between judicially imposed and voluntarily adopted race-
conscious affirmative action plans was unnecessary to the court's decision.
The district court went on to hold that even a court could not mandate the
quota system adopted by defendants in this case because a court's authority to
order affirmative action relief is limited to situations in which prior discrimi-
natory employment practices displaced employees from their "rightful place"
in the employment scheme. In other words, this equitable remedy is appropri-
ate only when there has been a judicial determination of unlawful discrimina-
tion.180 Kaiser had specifically denied any discriminatory conduct, either in
hiring or promotion, since the opening of its Gramercy plant in 1958. The
district court accepted Weber's argument that since black workers who were
selected were not themselves identifiable victims of unlawful discrimination,
blacks already occupied their "rightful place"'18 1 at the Gramercy plant. The
court held that in the absence of evidence of prior discrimination and identifi-
able victims of that prior discrimination, the hiring ratio must be considered
an unlawful racial preference in violation of Title VII.18 2 The court also
found a conflict between Executive Order 11,246 and Title VII. It resolved the
conflict in favor of Title VII because of its emphasis on prohibiting discrimina-
tion against individuals.'18 3 Thus, the court held that to the extent the Execu-
tive Order required the results argued for by defendants, it was unlawful.1
8 4
C The Fifth Circuit Opinion
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court by two-to-one
vote.185 However, the majority rejected the lower court's position that an em-
ployer is more restricted than a court in instituting a voluntary race-conscious
distinguishing between private and judicially imposed quotas. Quotas should be deemed to be an
extraordinary remedy to be imposed with extreme caution and discretion and only when the
courts are in a position to ensure that due process is afforded to all parties in fashioning such
relief. Furthermore, the assurance that such a remedy will be imposed solely by the courts ensures
that these remedial programs will be uniformly designed and administered and will be in exist-
ence only as long as necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Civil Rights Act. Id at 767-68.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied sub non Harris v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
180. 415 F. Supp. at 769.
181. Id
182. Id Despite the statistical disparity between the percentage of blacks in the craft jobs and
the percentage of blacks in the local work force, the court concluded that Kaiser had not discrimi-
nated against minorities when filling vacancies. The court focused on the evidence that Kaiser
had undertaken vigorous efforts to recruit trained black craftsmen from the surrounding commu-
nity, including advertising in minority-oriented newspapers and periodicals. Since minority
craftsmen in the Gramercy area were either unresponsive or virtually nonexistent, these affirma-
tive recruiting attempts proved fruitless. Id at 764.
183. "This Court, however, is not sufficiently skilled in the art of sophistry to justify such
discrimination by employers in light of the unequivocal prohibitions against racial discrimination
against any individual contained in Sections 703(a) and (d) of the 1964 Act." Id at 769 (emphasis
in original).
184. Id at 769-70. The court further held that any exceptions to the prohibitions of Title VII
should be made by Congress and not the judiciary. Id
185. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
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remedy. The majority found that the district court's approach was inconsis-
tent with the fundamental policy objective of Title VII-the elimination of
unlawful employment practices through voluntary compliance and private set-
tlement. 186 Nevertheless, the majority agreed with the second reason given by
the district court for invalidating the affirmative action plan, and concluded
that the hiring ratio used by Kaiser could not be approved even if it had been
judicially mandated. While a majority of the panel recognized that Title VII
permits preferential treatment for identifiable victims of past discrimination, it
affirmed the lower court's finding that no evidence of past discrimination had
been presented. The court concluded, therefore, as had the court below, that
in "the absence of prior discrimination, a racial quota loses its character as an
equitable remedy and must be barred as an unlawful racial preference" that
violates sections 703(a)(1) and (d) of Title VII.'
8 7
The majority also rejected defendant's argument that the affirmative ac-
tion plans should be upheld as compensation for the lack of minority training
in crafts that was caused by societal discrimination.18 8 The court, echoing the
disparate treatment strand of Griggs, reasoned that Title VII was not intended
to provide relief for the effects of all racial discrimination. Rather, the Act
authorizes racial preferences only if instituted to provide a remedy for employ-
ees who are identifiable victims of proven discrimination within a particular
employment scheme. Since there was no such proven discrimination here, ei-
ther intentional or in effect, the court found no justification for interfering with
the operation of the seniority system by superimposing on it a racial hiring
ratio.189
Another argument rejected by the panel was that the hiring ratio included
in the collective-bargaining agreement was mandated by Executive Order
11,246. This Order and the accompanying interpretive regulations issued by
OFCCP require all government contractors, regardless of prior discrimination,
to implement affirmative action "goals and timetables" if a self-analysis of
their work force reveals a statistical "underutilization" or "underrepresenta-
tion" of minorities. 190 Kaiser's argument that it was required by the Order to
establish an affirmative action plan to remedy the significant underrepresenta-
tion of blacks in its crafts positions was rejected on the ground that the obliga-
tion, even if imposed by the Executive Order, conflicted with section 703(d) of
Title VII, which prohibits the use of racial classifications in determining eligi-
bility for on-the-job training programs.' 9 1 The court concluded that any con-
186. Id at 223.
187. Id at 224 (emphasis in original).
188. Id at 225.
189. Id at 225-26.
190. 41 C.F.R. § 60.1 (1979). See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae at 17, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
191. 563 F.2d at 227. Section 703(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization,
or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or re-
training, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual
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flict between the Executive Order and Title VII must be resolved in favor of
the statute.1 92
In his dissent Judge Wisdom formulated a reasonableness standard by
which to test the validity of voluntary affirmative action programs. He argued
that the majority was correct in rejecting the first ground of the district court's
opinion-that only a court may institute an affirmative action quota to remedy
prior discrimination-noting that this position, if accepted, would totally un-
dermine the congressionally-favored policy of voluntary compliance. 193 He
maintained, however, that by accepting the district court's alternative hold-
ing-that an employer could institute a voluntary affirmative action plan only
if that plan could have been imposed by a court and that even a court could
not have imposed the plan in this case-the -majority adopted a standard that
would lead indirectly to precisely the same result-the death-knell for volun-
tary compliance and conciliation under the Act.
194
Judge Wisdom argued that the majority's theory placed the employer and
the union in an untenable position.195 If the company and union elected not
to institute a voluntary remedy, they faced the risk of liability to blacks in
private Title VII actions, federal pattern and practice suits by the EEOC, and
sanctions under the Executive Order. On the other hand, if they instituted a
voluntary remedy, and that plan was deemed excessive by a reviewing court,
they would be liable to white employees in private or federal suits alleging
reverse discrimination. 196 In addition, their good faith in attempting to com-
ply with Title VII would not be a defense to liability. Judge Wisdom argued
that the majority's approach would frustrate the congressional policy of volun-
tary compliance and flood the courts with more Title VII litigation, thus fur-
ther delaying the implementation of the national policy to eliminate racial
discrimination.
197
Judge Wisdom then suggested a less stringent standard for evaluating vol-
untary affirmative action plans: "If an affirmative action plan, adopted in a
collective bargaining agreement, is a reasonable remedy for an arguable viola-
tion of Title VII, it should be upheld."'198 In support of his "arguable viola-
tion" approach, Judge Wisdom argued that it was inappropriate to require a
conclusive finding or admission of prior discrimination before upholding a
voluntary affirmative action plan. A finding of prior discrimination will
rarely, if ever, be established in the case of a voluntarily imposed remedy in a
reverse discrimination lawsuit because none of the parties will be interested in
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employ-
ment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
192. "[E]xecutive Orders may not override contradictory congressional expressions." 563 F.2d
at 227.
193. Id at 229 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
194. Id at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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proving discrimination.199 Weber, the dissent noted, realized that the presen-
tation of evidence of discrimination would seriously undermine his chances of
proving reverse discrimination. The company and the union, on the other
hand, recognized that while they might justify their voluntary remedy by ad-
mitting past discrimination against blacks, they could do so only at the cost of
inviting private Title VII suits by blacks. This, Judge Wisdom noted, was "a
pyrrhic victory at best.
' '200
Judge Wisdom maintained that the affirmative action plan should have
been upheld under his "arguable violation" standard, contending that the evi-
dence indicated the existence of three possible or probable violations. First,
the statistical disparity between the percentage of blacks in the Gramercy
plant and the percentage of blacks in the area work force constituted a prima
facie case of plant-wide hiring discrimination under the Griggs theory. Sec-
ond, the prior experience requirement for admission to Kaiser's earlier craft
training program may have had a disparate impact under a Griggs analysis.
Third, the requirement of any training at all for some of the company's craft
jobs may have been illegal since it had a disparate impact on minorities and
arguably could not be justified by business necessity.
20'
Judge Wisdom also suggested two other grounds for upholding Kaiser's
plan. First, he argued that the affirmative action plan was valid as a proper
remedy for societal discrimination against blacks.202 Alternatively, he main-
tamined that Kaiser's program was not only permissible but actually required by
Executive Order 11,246. While he agreed with the majority's conclusion that
any conflict between the Executive Order and Title VII must be resolved in
favor of the statute, he concluded that the Executive Order was entirely consis-
tent with the primary purpose of Title VII.
20 3
The fundamental difference between the majority and Judge Wisdom was
the theory of equality used by each to determine the issues raised by the par-
ties. The majority adopted a rigid adherence to the McDonnell/McDonald
disparate treatment theory. Judge Wisdom, on the other hand, although he
did attempt to make an accommodation between the two theories, relied heav-
ily on the Griggs disparate impact theory.
D. The Supreme Court Decision
1. General Considerations
In Weber the Supreme Court had to decide the question of the legality of
race-specific quotas in a voluntary affirmative action plan. More importantly,
however, the Court faced the problem of resolving the conflict between the
primary purpose of Title VII, with its emphasis on voluntary compliance, and
199. Id at 231 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
200. Id
201. Id at 231-32.
202. Id at 234-36.
203. Id at 236-38.
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the competing notions of equality that the Court had read into the statute.
Although the concept of affirmative action was clearly an important aspect of
the national policy against employment discrimination, the statutory language
sustained two conflicting interpretations.
The task before the Court in Weber was the determination of congres-
sional intent, which entails the formidable task of historical reconstruction.
The social and political atmosphere that gives birth to a statute, as well as the
needs and agitation that provoke it, must be sympathetically understood.
Congressional purpose, however dimly made out, must be translated forward
and related to contemporaneous or later relevant enactments and other
changes, such as the development of new constitutional or statutory ap-
proaches. Translation forward can present very intricate problems when stat-
utes that have acquired a certain "gloss" are in question. As recognized either
explicitly or implicitly in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in
Weber, the legislative debates provided no clear and unequivocal answer to
the question the Court faced in Weber.2° 4 In addition, a review of the
Supreme Court cases on employment discrimination demonstrated a shift in
the doctrinal foundations that caused misinterpretation and confusion. The
Court simply had not attempted to build a bridge between its earlier and later
cases. In short, the Court had not, in the more recent Title VII cases, at-
tempted to lay a foundation for the reasoned analysis expected of the judiciary
in a democratic society.
205
2. Bakke
The initial problem for the Court in Weber was whether constitutional
analysis, statutory analysis, or both, should be employed to decide the case. A
starting point, of course, is the rule that constitutional issues ought to be
avoided by adopting that construction of a statute which does not raise
them. 20 6 However, the problem of which analytical approach to use had been
204. Remarks of certain Senators "were not addressed to temporary, voluntary affirmative
measures undertaken to eliminate manifest racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job cate-
gories." Weber, 443 U.S. at 207 n.7 (Brennan, J.); In Bakke, Justice Brennan criticized Justice
Steven's view that the legislative history supported a color-blind theory of Title VII, because the
"fragmentary comments" from the legislative history on which Justice Stevens relied "fall far
short" in support of that theory. 438 U.S. at 340 n.17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). He further noted that the same is true with regard to Title VII. Id (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part). "[I] share some of the misgivings... concerning the extent to
which the legislative history clearly supports the result .. " Weber, 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun,
J., concurring). "Section 7036) apparently calmed the fears of most of its opponents; after its
introduction, complaints concerning racial balance and preferential treatment died down consid-
erably." Id at 247 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
205. See A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976)
(In expounding the Constitution, the Court's role is to discern "principles sufficiently absolute to
give them roots throughout the community and continuity over significant periods of time, and to
lift them above the level of pragmatic political judgments of a particular time and place."); H.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121 (1961) ("In any large group, general rules, standards and prin-
ciples must be the main instruments of social control, and not particular directions given to each
individual separately.").
206. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947); Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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compounded by the decision of the Court a year earlier in Regents of Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke.207 Bakke also involved the legality of the affirma-
tive action principle, but was decided in the context of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.208 Title VI provides that no person on the grounds of race
or color shall be excluded from participating in any program receiving federal
financial assistance.209 In Bakke a majority of the Justices reached the consti-
tutional issue on affirmative action because they found that Congress intended
to make the constitutional and statutory rights coextensive.
210
The decision in Bakke suggests that a majority of the Justices struggled to
fit the difficult problem raised by the affirmative action concept into the tradi-
tional analysis of the fourteenth amendment's "equal protection" clause. That
clause simply forbids a state to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law." 21' The Court has developed what constitutional
scholars call a "two-tiered analysis"'212 to flush out the constitution's slender
admonition. Since every state action benefits some people more than others,
the vast majority of these actions are entitled to only "ordinary" scrutiny. But
those that affect "fundamental rights" or benefit people on the basis of a "sus-
pect classification" receive "strict scrutiny." Discrimination on the basis of
race has always been the clearest suspect classification.
213
The attempt to apply the principles of Bakke to Weber, however, is frus-
trated by the difficulty of discerning just what those principles are.214 The
array of opinions include five votes for a series of conflicting propositions,
each of which might lead to a different view of the legality of quotas under
Title VII. Five Justices suggest that race may be a factor considered in judi-
cial, legislative, or administrative determinations. In general, however, the
tone of several of the Bakke opinions seems to disfavor the use of any criteria
that exclude individuals on the basis of race.
Justice Powell, in his plurality opinion, emphasized the personal or indi-
vidual nature of constitutional rights. Bakke was excluded from consideration
for admission because of his race, and this infringement on his individual
207. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
209. Id
210. See note 5 supra.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
212. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward" In Search o/Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). See
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTIONAL LAW, 994-1005 (1978); Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969). See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 n.30
(Brennan, J.).
213. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944).
214. See, e.g., United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980) ("We
frankly admit that we are not entirely sure what to make of the various Bakke opinions. In over
one hundred and fifty pages of United States Reports, the Justices have told us mainly that they
have agreed to disagree."); Edwards, Preferential Remedies andaAffirmative Action In Employment
in the Wake of Bakke, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 113, 115; Karst & Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and
Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 7 (1979).
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rights raised serious constitutional questions for Powell. 21 5 Four other Justices
concurred with this emphasis on the personal and individual nature of the
rights involved.216 This proposition raised serious questions about the affirm-
ative action plan in Weber since individual employees and applicants for craft
training would be both included and excluded for consideration solely on the
basis of race. If the Court were to apply a constitutional analysis to Title VII,
as it did to Title VI, Weber, under this strand of Powell's analysis, would seem
to have a valid claim. 2
17
215. If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications
based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon per-
sonal rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a particular
group, then constitutional standards may be applied consistently. Political judgments
regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be weighed in the constitu-
tional balance, but the standard ofjustification will remain constant. This is as it should
be, since those political judgments are 'the product of rough compromise struck by con-
tending groups within the democratic process. When they touch upon an individual's
race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is
asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental inter-
est. The Constitution guarantees that right to every person regardless of his background.
438 U.S. at 299 (Powell, J.) (footnote and citations omitted).
Justice Powell emphasized that the fourteenth amendment protects all persons equally: "It is
settled beyond question that the 'rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment
are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights."' Id at
289 (quoting Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)). He further stated that "[t]he guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not
equal." Id at 289-90.
Justice Powell rejected the theory that the fourteenth amendment was primarily a protective
device to be used by racial and ethnic minority groups. He rejected any view of the Constitution
that requires individuals to suffer impermissible burdens in order to enhance the interests of dif-
ferent social groups. When the university urged the Court to hold that discrimination against
whites cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as "benign," Justice Powell responded:
"The clock of our liberties cannot be turned back to 1868. It is far too late to argue that the
guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a
degree of protection greater than that accorded to others." Id at 295 (emphasis in original) (cita-
tions omitted)).
216. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist,
also attached great importance to the personal nature of the right involved in Bakke. Justice
Stevens, however, chose to rely solely on Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in concluding that
the minority admissions program at Davis was invalid, id at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), relying on the settled practice to "avoid the decision of a constitutional
issue if a case can be fairly decided on a statutory ground." Id at 411. Justice Stevens found that
there was no exception within Title VI based on the existence of a benign quota: "Petitioner
contends, however, that exclusion of applicants on the basis of race does not violate Title VI if the
exclusion carries with it no racial stigma. No such qualification or limitation of§ 601's categorical
prohibition of 'exclusion' is justified by the statute or its history." Id at 414. The university had
excluded Bakke from its medical program because of his race, yet, at the same time, was receiving
federal funds. To Justice Stevens, this combination of factors led to the inescapable conclusion
that the university had violated Title VI. According to Justice Stevens, the statute had to be
interpreted on its face. He stressed that the legislative history of § 601 revealed that its opponents
feared that the term "discrimination" would be read as mandating racial quotas and "racially
balanced colleges and universities." Id at 414-15. In response, the proponents of the legislation
"gave repeated assurances that the Act would be 'colorblind' in its application." Id at 415. As a
consequence of the wording and history of the statute, Justice Stevens felt that it had to be applied
equally to everyone, regardless of race. Id at 418.
217. A related problem that concerned Justice Powell was how "minorities" would be defined
for the purposes of dispensing preferential treatment: "The concepts of 'majority' and 'minority'
necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments. As observed above, the white
'majority' itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history
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On the other hand, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, implied that racial preferences and exclusions are
permissible if used for remedial purposes after a finding of past discrimination
by a governmental body competent to make that finding.218 Courts and ad-
ministrative agencies, such as the EEOC and OFCC, have ordered preferential
race-conscious remedies for blacks, which of necessity have resulted in the
exclusion of whites.2 19 In Bakke, however, there had been no finding that
would have provided the predicate for the remedial admissions policy. More-
over, Justice Powell did not think that the medical school was competent to
make that finding.
220
The Court in Bakke broke down this way. Four Justices-Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun-believed that "reverse discrimination" pro-
grams of almost any sort violate neither the constitution nor the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.221 Another four-Burger, Stewart, Stevens, and Rehnquist-be-
of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals." 438 U.S. at 295 (Powell,
J.).
This problem was not of great concern to Justice Brennan, as he believed the term "minority"
was capable of principled definition on the basis of racial heritage. He noted that legislation
requiring that recipients of public works grants use at least 10% of the grant for minority business
enterprises defined minorities as "citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speak-
ing, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." Id at 348 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(f)(2) (West
Cum. Supp. 1978)) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Later in his opinion, Justice Brennan distinguished the white "majority" from racial minor-
ities on the ground that whites as a class had not been "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."
Id at 357 (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
218. The implication seems to be based on a presumed state interest in ameliorating or elimi-
nating the effects of past discrimination. Justice Powell found that "[t]he State certainly has a
legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling
effects of identified discrimination." Id at 307 (Powell, J.) Yet, before such racial preference and
exclusion are permissible, a finding of prior discrimination must be made and "[b]efore relying
upon these sorts of findings in establishing a racial classification, a governmental body must have
the authority and capability to establish, in the record, that the classification is responsive to iden-
tified discrimination." Id at 309. Justice Powell found that the university was an educational
institution rather than a civil rights agency and therefore lacked the capability. Id at 310. As a
result, it could not carry its burden of justification on the issue:
Hence, the purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical
School perceived as victims of "societal discrimination" does not justify a classification
that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility for
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have
suffered. To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for viola-
tions of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could
grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimina-
tion. That is a step we have never approved.
Id (citations omitted).
219. Justice Powell found that preferences have been upheld "where a legislative or adminis-
trative body charged with the responsibility made determinations of past discrimination by the
industries affected, and fashioned remedies deemed appropriate to rectify the discrimination." Id
at 301.
220. Id at 310.
221. The Brennan group candidly embraced racial preferences that are soundly designed to
remedy the effects of societal discrimination against minorities. See id at 362-63 (Brennan, J.). A
racial classification used for such "benign" purposes need not be subjected to the extremely severe
standard of judicial review that has been applied to discrimination that stigmatizes a group or
works against a minority. Id at 356-62. Instead, the Brennan group would test "benign" racial
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lieved that any discrimination on the basis of race by an institution receiving
federal aid violates the Civil Rights Act. Therefore, these four found it unnec-
essary to discuss the constitutional question.222 The ninth Justice, Powell, be-
lieved that it is permissible for institutions to take race into account as a
"factor" in their admission decisions but that a plan specifically reserving six-
teen places for minorities went too far in institutionalizing racial discrimina-
tion.
22s
Justice Powell and the other four Justices who discussed the constitutional
question gave two very different explanations for why state action that makes
distinctions based on race is not automatically invalid in the context of reverse
discrimination. The theory of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun is
that a racial classification that operates to the disadvantage of whites is not the
same as one that operates against blacks and other minorities. The purpose of
the equal protection clause, by this line of reasoning, is to protect a discrete
and insular minority. It is intended to help the kind of group that is least able
to protect its own interest through the political process and so must be pro-
tected from the tyranny of the majority.224 Whites simply do not qualify for
this special constitutional protection. These Justices proposed that "racial
classification established ostensibly for benign purposes ' 225 be subject only to
the sort of middle-level scrutiny that they described as "strict and searching"
but not necessarily "fatal." 226 Under this standard, a race-conscious affirma-
tive action program could survive as long as it did not stigmatize or burden
any group less well represented in the political process. That is to say, an
classification against the intermediate, although "searching" standard of review that the Court has
adopted for cases of sex discrimination. Id at 359-62; see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). To
survive this intermediate scrutiny, the classification must serve an "important and articulated"
purpose, and it must be "substantially related" to achieving that purpose. 438 U.S. at 361-62.
(Brennan, J.).
222. Justice Stevens argued on behalf of himself and the three other Justices (Chief Justice
Burger, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist) that the Davis program violated the "'crystal clear" lan-
guage of the ban on discrimination in Title VI. 438 U.S. at 417-18 (Stevens, J.). He emphasized
that the broad language of Title VI must be considered distinct from the fourteenth amendment
question: "INjeither its language nor any prior interpretation suggests that its place in the Civil
Rights Act, won after long debate, is simply that of a constitutional appendage." Id at 418 (foot-
note omitted). Accordingly, Justice Stevens and the three other Justices who joined Justice Pow-
ell's opinion did not address the constitutional question. Id at 411-12.
223. Id at 318 (Powell, J.).
224. Id at 357 (Brennan, J.) (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938)).
225. Id at 361.
226. Id at 362. Justice Powell devotes much of the first part of his opinion to rejecting the
Brennan groups' analysis. Two points of doctrinal difference are discussed. First, for Justice Pow-
ell, when the issue is the proper standard of review, there is no such things as a "benign" racial
classification. All classifications by race, whether they produce immediate stigmatizing effects and
whether they work against minorities, demand the rigors of "strict scrutiny." The state must seek
to serve a "compelling" interest and must demonstrate that its racial classification is "necessary"
for achieving that purpose. Second, the state has a substantial interest in compensating for soci-
ety's past discrimination. Justice Powell agrees, but the universities and the courts had no princi-
pled basis for selecting those minorities who are deserving of preference, id at 294-99 (Powell, J.),
and the interest in remedying the effects of discrimination normally cannot support placing bur-
dens on individuals who are themselves not responsible for the discrimination. Id at 307-10.
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affirmative plan could not reserve places for Chicanos by denying them explic-
itly to blacks.
Justice Powell's theory is that all racial distinctions are equally suspect,
but in the case of most affirmative action programs, the suspect classification
faces "strict scrutiny" and survives it.2 27 Powell believed that a university's
need to maintain racial diversity in a student body is a "substantial" enough
goal to justify even a suspect racial classification. However, the particular
method an institution chooses must be "necessary" to the achievement of that
goal,228 and Powell did not consider rigid quotas "necessary" when other af-
firmative action methods are available.229 This seems to explain why he voted
to invalidate the Davis program while upholding the general right of institu-
tions to use race as a factor in their admissions decisions.
Because Justice Powell's vote was decisive in Bakke, courts and commen-
tators have searched his opinion for indications of how far he would be willing
to go in upholding similar affirmative action programs in employment dis-
227. See Karst & Horowitz, supra note 214, at 15-17, in which the authors note that:
Diversity and the relevance ofpast discrimination. Justice Powell's first opinion re-
jects the Brennan group's argument that race-conscious remedies for the effects of past
societal discrimination against minorities are valid. His "diversity" approach to univer-
sity admissions, however, once again blurs the distinctions separating him from his four
brethren. Underlying Justice Powell's approach is the unspoken assumption that the
history of racial discrmination in this country inevitably makes race a valid considera-
tion in the diversity formula.
Harvard has concluded, with Justice Powell's after-the-fact blessing, that "a black
student can usually bring something [to the educational process] that a white person
cannot offer." Additionally, in Harvard's view, "the critical criteria are often individual
qualities or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associated with it." The
educational advantage of racial diversity among students is that a minority student's
distinctive set of attitudes and experiences can broaden the education of the university's
students generally. Race, in other words, is a socially significant fact in American soci-
ety.
The next logical step is a small one: it requires only that we ask why race is so
significant. No one would think it desirable to seek diversity in a professional school by
giving a "plus" to applicants who are double-jointed or whose wisdom teeth are im-
pacted. Such persons offer nothing special to the educational process by virtue of those
qualities. If race is relevant to the goal of "educational pluralism," the point surely isth t a black student in, for example, a law school's criminal procedure class may have a
view of police conduct that is quite different from 
the views of his white classmates. That
difference in perspective is related to the perception by large numbers of blacks that thepolice in this country have often been an instrument for keeping blacks "in their place."It is the history of racial subordination, above all, that mak s race socially significant. If
a black student can "bring something that a white person cannot offer," the "somehig"is, primarily, an inheritance from past societal discrimination.
Similarly, it is our history of racial discrimination that requires a university to use
admissions criteria other than academic performance if it is to admit a racially diverse
entering class. There is no need to seek out white admittees in order to achieve this
"diversity," because many white applicants will be admitted on the traditional criteria of
academic performance, test scores, and the like. Correspondingly, if these traditionalcriteria do not produce substantial numbers of minor ity a ttees, common sense su-n
gests the reason: racial discrimination over the generations has taken its educational tol.
Thus, in order to assure racial diversity in its student body, a university must give a
"plus" to these a group of candidates who would be the beneficiaries of a program
explicitly designed to remedy the present effects of past societal discrimination.
(Footnotes omitted).
228. 438 U.S. at 313-15. See also id at 312 n.48 (Powell, J.).
229. Id at 310, 315.
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crimination cases.230 Apparently, Powell objects not only to quotas, but also
to any system that does not treat "each applicant as an individual in the ad-
missions process."' 23 1 He was in favor of "an admissions program. . . flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity, in light of the particular
qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for
consideration, although not necessarily according to the same weight."2 32 He
seemed to object to "a classification that imposes disadvantges upon persons
[like Brian Weber] who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the benefi-
ciaries of special admissions programs are thought to have suffered."2 33 The
lower courts have given special attention to these phrases from Powell's opin-
ion in deciding on the validity of other affirmative action programs.
One oddity of Justice Powell's opinion is the suggestion that any form of
discrimination, even quotas, is lawful if it is imposed as a remedy following a
judicial, legislative, or administrative finding of past discrimination.234 The
purpose of this suggestion apparently was to preserve earlier Court decisions
upholding quotas and other explicitly racial remedies for civil rights viola-
tions. But it created the anomalous possibility that the same program found
unlawful in Bakke could have been reinstated if a competent legislative, exec-
utive, or judicial body had issued it after an official finding that the university
had in the past discriminated against minorities in medical school admissions.
3. Weber
The Court in Weber adopted a different analytical approach than the one
it took in Bakke. All of the Justices in Weber decided the case solely on statu-
tory grounds.235 Justice Brennan, in his opinion for the Court, initially fo-
230. See, e.g., United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980); Detroit
Police Officer's Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 691, 694 (6th Cir. 1979); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens &
Co., 585 F.2d 625, 646 (4th Cir. 1978); Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1292-94 (5th Cir. 1978).
231. 438 U.S. at 318 (Powell, J.).
232. Id at 317.
233. Id at 310.
234. See id at 307-10. See also United Jewish Organization of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144 (1977); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225
(1969); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
235. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and
Stewart, delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist filed
dissenting opinions. Justices Powell and Stevens did not participate. Four of the five of the Jus-
tices comprising the Weber majority (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun) joined in Bakke.
The Weber majority (the Bakce "Brennan four" and Justice Stewart) avoided a discussion of
the potentially inconsistent analytical approach in the two cases. Weber and Bakke were distin-
guished in a footnote:
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, considered in [Bakke], contains no provi-
sion comparable to § 703(). This is because Title VI was an exercise of federal power
over a matter in which the Federal Government was already directly involved: the
prohibitions against race-based conduct contained in Title VI governed "program[s] or
activity[ies] receiving Federal financial assistance."... Congress was legislating to as-
sure federal funds would not be used in an improper manner. Title VII, by contrast, was
enacted pursuant to the commerce power to regulate purely private decisionmaking and
was not intended to incorporate and particularize the commands of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. Title VII and Title VI, therefore, cannot be read inpari materia.
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cused on the voluntary nature of the affirmative action program and narrowed
the issue to whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions from insti-
tuting race-conscious quota systems to correct racial imbalances in tradition-
ally segregated job categories. 236 Rejecting Weber's reliance upon a literal
interpretation of sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII, Justice Brennan reasoned
that, in order to determine the precise meaning and spirit of the statute, the
sections must be read in the context of their legislative history and the histori-
cal background against which they were enacted.237 The Court also rejected
Weber's reliance on McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation Company, noting
that McDonald expressly left open the question of the permissibility of affirm-
ative action plans.
238
After examining the legislative history and the historical background of
Title VII, the Court concluded that the purpose of the statute would be frus-
trated if all affirmative action programs were forbidden. Quoting remarks
from various legislators of the 88th Congress, which enacted Title VII, the
Court found that the statute was intended to alleviate the economic plight of
blacks by opening employment opportunities through nondiscriminatory poli-
cies.239 The Court found support in the legislative history for the premise that
Congress did not intend to prohibit all private, voluntary affirmative action
efforts to remedy past racial injustices. 240 The Court also relied upon its deci-
sion in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,241 which held that the language and
history of Title VII manifested an intention to spur self-evaluation by employ-
ers and unions of their employment practices with the expectation that they
Id at 206 n.6 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 367-69 (Bren-
nan, J.).
236. Justice Brennan set out two articulations of the issue. Initially he stated the issue as
"whether Congress, in Title VII. . left employers and unions in the private sector free to take
such race-conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job
categories." 443 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added). Later, he stated that the "only question before us
is the narrow statutory issue of whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions from
voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences in the
manner and for the purpose provided in the Kaiser-USWA plan. Id at 200 (emphasis in original).
237. Id at 201-02.
238. Id at 200-01.
239. Id at 202. Senator Humphrey emphasized the importance of the law prohibiting dis-
crimination in employment:
What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine restaurant if he cannot
afford to pay the bill? What good does it do him to be accepted in a hotel that is too
expensive for his modest income? How can a Negro child be motivated to take full
advantage of integrated educational facilities if he has no hope of getting a job where he
can use that education? Without a job, one cannot afford public convenience and ac-
comodations.
Id at 203 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6547, 6552 (1964)).
240. H.R. 7152 was later to become the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The excerpt provided:
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and consequences of
racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. There is reason to believe,
however, that national leadership provided by the enactment of Federal legislation deal-
ing with the most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary
or local resolution of other forms of discrimination.
443 U.S. at 203-04 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963), reprinted in
[1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355, 2393) (emphasis added by the Court).
241. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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would eliminate "the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in
this country's history. '24 2 The Court found that Moody could not be inter-
preted to prohibit all private, voluntary race-conscious measures designed to
correct those vestiges.
243
Justice Brennan also relied on legislative history when he considered the
extent of the limitation found in section 7030). He recognized that several
congressmen had objected that Title VII would require employers to give pref-
erential treatment to minorities to correct racial imbalances. 244 Nevertheless,
Justice Brennan found it persuasive that Congress drafted section 7030) to
read that nothing contained in Title VII "shall be interpreted to require any
employer. . . to grant preferential treatment. . . to any group because of the
race. . . of such. . . group. . .," rather than drafting it to read "nothing in
Title VII shall be interpreted topermit voluntary affirmative efforts to correct
racial imbalances." 245 He then concluded that the congressional silence on the
242. 443 U.S. at 204 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418).
243. Id at 204.
244. Id at 205. See note 204 supra.
245. Id at 205-06 (emphasis in original).
The legislative history of the original enactment of Title VII in 1964 demonstrates neither
clear approval nor disapproval by Congress of voluntary race-conscious efforts to correct the ef-
fects of the past discriminatory exclusion of blacks from training and job opportunities. The ma-
jor argument against congressional approval of such efforts is premised upon the addition to the
bill on the Senate floor of§ 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976), which states that nothing in Title
VII shall "require" preferential treatment because of race "on account of an imbalance...."
Prior to the adoption of this amendment, the Senate floor managers of the bill had explained
that Title VII would not require an employer to maintain a racially balanced work force because,
[w]hile the presence or absence of other members of the same minority group in the work
force may be a relevant factor in determining whether in a given case a decision to hire
or to refuse to hire was based on race, color, etc., it is only one factor, and the question in
each case would be whether that individual was discriminated against.
110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964) (interpretive memorandum of Senators Clark and Case). Notwith-
standing this assurance, opponents of the bill continued to argue "that a quota system will be
imposed, with employers hiring and unions accepting members, on the basis of the percentage of
population represented by each specific minority group." Id at 9881 (remarks of Senator Allott).
To put these doubts to rest, Senator A~lott proposed an amendment precluding a finding of unlaw-
ful discrimination "solely on the basis of evidence that an imbalance exists. . ., without support-
ing evidence of another nature that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in such practice."
Id at 9881-82. The sense of this amendment was incorporated, in the language of§ 702(j), as part
of the Dirksen-Mansfleld compromise, which resulted in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As Senator
Humphrey explained, in presenting the compromise amendments to the Senate:
A new subsection 7036) is added to deal with the problem of racial balance among
employees. The proponents of this bill have carefully stated on numerous occasions that
title VII does not require an employer to achieve any sort of racial balance in his work
force by giving preferential treatment to any individual or group. Since doubts have
persisted, subsection (j) is added to state this point expressly.
Id at 12723.
The concern of Congress in enacting § 702(j) was not directed to the question whether race
could be taken into account for remedial purposes. Rather, its intent was to ensure that findings
of discrimination would not be based solely on evidence of statistical imbalance and to allay the
fear that Title VII would have the effect of requiring employers to maintain a specific racial bal-
ance of employees.
Senators Clark and Case also stated that "any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance,
whatever such a balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII because maintaining such a
balance would require an employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of race." Id at 7213.
Senator Allott believed that "a quota system of hiring would be a terrible mistake," but did not
indicate whether such a system would be unlawful. Id at 9881. These statements may indicate an
NORTH CAROLINA L4WREVIEW[o
permissibility of voluntary affirmative action indicated congressional approval
of plans similar to the quota system adopted by defendants.
246
The Court refused to define in detail the distinguishing characteristics be-
tween permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans.247 It did, how-
ever, examine defendants' plan and found it to be within the permissible
limits. First, the Court noted that the plan was "designed to break down old
patterns of racial segregation or hierachy" resulting from the historical exclu-
sion of blacks from skilled craft jobs.248 Second, the Court found that the plan
did not unduly "trammel the interests of the white employees" because white
employees were not totally excluded from the training program. Third, the
Court found that the remedy was a temporary one,249 was not designed to
maintain racial balance, and thus was not in violation of section 7030). Fi-
intention to prohibit employers from deliberately maintaining a particular racial composition of
employees as an end in itself, but they do not suggest any intention to foreclose "the voluntary use
of racial preferences to assist minorities to surmount the obstacles imposed by the remnants of
past discrimination." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 340 n.17 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ.).
The language of § 703(j), like that of § 703(h), does not restrict or qualify otherwise appropri-
ate remedial action but defines what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice. Cf
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 758-62 (1976) (action of awarding seniority
rights to truck drivers not barred as matter of law by § 703(h)). The legislative history of the 1964
Act shows no detailed consideration of the scope and nature of remedial actions which might be
taken by employers and unions or ordered by the courts, and it shows no consideration whatever
of the permissibility of race-conscious remedial measures. See generally EEOC, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1968). Also, Justice Powell noted
in Bakke that "[t]here simply was no reason for Congress to consider the validity of hypothetical
preferences that might be accorded minority citizens; the legislators were dealing with e real and
pressing problem of how to guarantee those citizens equal treatment." 438 U.S. at 285 (Powell, J.).
There is no indication that "in the absence of any consideration of the question,. . . Congress
intended to bar the use of racial preferences as a tool for achieving the objective of remedying past
discrimination or other compelling ends." Id at 340 n.17 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
JJ.).
Although Justice Powell did not participate in Weber, he noted in his opinion in Bakke that:
Although isolated statements of various legislators, taken out of context, can be mar-
shaled in support of the proposition that [Title VII] enacted a purely color-blind scheme,
without regard to the reach of the Equal Protection Clause, these comments must be read
against the background of both the problem that Congress was addressing and the
broader view of the statute that emerges from a full examination of the legislative de-
bates.
Id at 284-85 (Powell, J.)
Similarly, Justice Stevens did not participate in Weber. In Bakke, however, he too noted
that:
Title VI is an integral part of the far-reaching Civil Rights Act of 1964. No doubt,
when this legislation was being debated, Congress was not directly concerned with the
legality of '*everse discrimination" or "aflirmative action. " Its attention was focused on
the problem at hand, the "glaring ...discrimination against Negroes which exists
throughout our Nation."...
438 U.S. at 413 (Stevens, J.) (citing H.R. REP. No. 914, Part 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963))
(reprinted in [1964]. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2393) (emphasis added). Justice Rehn-
quist joined in Justice Stevens' opinion in Bakke.
In addition, Justice Stevens said in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441
U.S. 600 (1979), that in "all cases of statutory construction [the] task is to interpret the words of
the [statute] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve." Id at 608.
246. Id
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nally, Justice Brennan noted that the creation of a new seniority right as a
qualifying factor for the new training program served to protect the employ-
ment expectancies of nonminority employees.250 In conclusion, Justice Bren-
nan found that the plan was in the discretionary area left by Title VII to
private employers to seek "to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in tradi-
tional segregated job categories."'25 1
Justice Blackmun, who joined the majority, also wrote a separate concur-
rence. Although he admitted that he shared some of the dissenters' misgivings
concerning the legislative history of Title VII, he thought the Court's result
was compelled by practical and equitable considerations. 252 He noted that if
an employer who has discriminated against blacks in the past takes no correc-
tive measures, he risks liability to blacks for his past violations. If, however,
the employer institutes an affirmative action program, he risks liability to
whites for claims of reverse discrimination.2 53 Blackmun hinted that a judicial
finding of a Title VII violation could have been established in the case under
the Griggs disparate impact theory based on Kaiser's statistical racial imbal-
ance and its arguably invalid job-related requirements of five years of prior
craft experience.2 54 Adopting the standard articulated by Judge Wisdom, he
then argued that employers who committed "arguable violations" of Title VII
should be free to take reasonable responses without fear of liability to
whites.255 Although in Judge Blackmun's view the arguable violations stan-
dard would enable employers to engage in preferential hiring "whether or not
a court, on these facts, could order the same step as a remedy," he viewed the
standard as a sensible response to a "practical problem in the administration
of Title VII."256 Finally, Justice Blackmun observed that the Kaiser plan was
moderate and that Congress could overrule the Weber decision if the Court
had misinterpreted congressional intent.
2 5 7
Justice Blackmun compared his "arguable violations" theory with the
"traditionally segregated job categories" theory of Justice Brennan. Although
he found that his theory would reach the same result as the theory relied upon
by the majority, he nevertheless preferred the "arguable violation" theory,
which he believed to be more in line with the judicial precedents requiring a
250. Id
251. Id at 209.
252. Id at 209 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
253. Id at 210-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Lo-
cal 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
254. In this case, Kaiser denies prior discrimination but concedes that its past hiring prac-
tices may be subject to question .... Kaiser had made some effort to recruit black
painters, carpenters, insulators and other craftmen, but it continued to insist that those
hired have five years prior industrial experience, a requirement that arguably was not
sufficiently job related to justify under Title VII any discriminatory impact it may have
had.
Id at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
255. Id at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
256. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring).
257. Id at 216 (Blackmun, ., concurring).
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finding of discrimination. 25 8 Blackmun was unwilling to adopt the majority's
"traditionally segregated job categories" theory because he failed to find statu-
tory support for race-conscious remedies designed to eliminate societal dis-
crimination. 259 Later, however, Blackmun avoided statutory constrictions
when he noted that private employers should not be prevented from amelio-
rating the effects of past societal discrimination simply because no remedy is
provided by Title VII.
260
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger chastised the majority for ignoring
what he perceived as an over-stepping of the bounds of separation of powers
by essentially rewriting the clear statutory language of Title VII to reach its
desired decision.26 1 He also criticized the majority for interpreting section
703(j) to permit employers to do what he believed sections 703(a) and (d) ex-
pressly forbade.2 62 Burger conceded that Congress may not have gone far
enough in the enactment of Title VII to correct the effects of past racial dis-
crimination, and he agreed with the majority that voluntary compliance with
Title VII should be encouraged. He nevertheless asserted that "compliance
with the no-discrimination principle that is the heart and soul of Title VII...
will [not] be achieved by permitting employers to discriminate against some
individuals to give preferential treatment to others. '263 He suggested that the
majority had arrived at a "good result," but that it had been achieved by un-
authorized and intellectually dishonest means.
264
In a vigorous and exhaustive dissent, Justice Rehnquist called the Court
"Orwellian" and compared the majority's interpretation to actions not charac-
teristic of "Hale, Holmes and Hughes, but escape artists such as Houdini.)
265
Initially relying upon the Court's prior Title VII decisions, Justice Rehnquist
read Griggs v. Duke Power Co. to stand solely for the proposition that Con-
gress intended to prohibit all racial preferences for any group.266 He then
258. Id at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
259. Id at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
260. "Absent compelling evidence of legislative intent, I would not interpret Title VII itself as
a means of'locking in' the effects of segregation for which Title VII provides no remedy." Id at
215.
261. Id at 216 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
262. Id at 217 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
263. Id at 218 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
264. Id at 219 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
265. Id at 219, 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The reference to the writings of George
Orwell, in the context of employment discrimination and affirmative action, had been noted in a
less stringent manner in Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World- Equalityfor the Negro--The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 364 (1966-67), where the author observed:
The problems involved in special and preferential treatment for the Negro are diffi-
cult an subtle ones. True, one can parody the whole idea by paraphrasing the pigs in
George Orwell's Animal Farm and asserting that all men are equal, but Negroes are
more equal than others. And admittedly, there is a certain irony in climaxing a long
struggle in the name of equality by demanding inequality. The fact is, however, that
even within our usual ideals of equality a series of arguments can be made for the special
treatment of Negroes.
266. 443 U.S. at 220. "In Griggs . our first occasion to interpret Title VII, a unanimous
Court observed that 'Idliscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely
and only what Congress has proscribed."' Id at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
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pointed to Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,267 which held that equal op-
portunity should extend to each applicant without consideration of the propor-
tionate racial representation in the work force.2 68 He concluded that these and
other cases represented consistent judicial interpretation of Title VII as a con-
gressional prohibition on all racial employment discrimination 2 69 This con-
clusion fails to withstand analysis as the earlier discussion herein
demonstrates.
270
Rehnquist joined Burger in emphasizing that the Court's duty is to con-
strue, not rewrite, legislation. First, relying solely on a plain meaning con-
struction, he stated that the clear statutory language prohibiting discrimination
was to be taken as the final expression of legislative intent.271 Second, Rehn-
quist relied heavily on Title VII legislative history to conclude that the legisla-
tive intent was to end all employment discrimination. 27 2 Some significant
portions of this history included remarks of Representative Celler and Sena-
tors Clark, Case, Humphrey, and Muskie.27 3 One excerpt he relied on was
Senator Saltonstall's remarks concerning the Dirksen-Manfield amendment to
the Act, which added section 7030): "[The amendment] provides no preferen-
tial treatment for any group of citizens. In fact, it specifically prohibits such
treatment. '27 4 Finally, Rehnquist attempted to meet the majority's reliance
on the "spirit" of the Act simply by noting that the congressional purpose was
to establish equal opportunity for all.275 Rehnquist predicted that the Court's
267. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
268. 443 U.S. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
269. Id at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
270. See text accompanying notes 129-161 supra.
271. Id at 228 n.9 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
272. Id at 230 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
273. "The Bill would do no more than prevent.. . employers from discriminating against or
infavor of workers because of their race, religion, or national origin." Id at 233 (quoting 110
Cong. Rec. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Representative Celler, House sponsor of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act)) (emphasis added by Justice Rehnquist).
There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in
his work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance,
whatever such a balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII because maintain-
ing such a balance would require an employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of
race. It must be emphasized that discrimination is prohibited as to any individual.
Id at 239 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964) (memorandum pre-
pared by Senators Clark and Case)).
[Tlitle [VII] does not provide that any preferential treatment in employment shall be
given to Negroes or to any other persons or groups. It does not provide that any quota
system may be established to maintain racial balance in employment. In fact, the title
wouldprohibitpreferentialtreatmentfor anyparticular group, and any person, whether or
not a member of any minority group, would be permitted to file a complaint of discrimi-
natory employment practices.
Id at 243 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 11848 (1964) (remarks of Senator
Humphrey)) (emphasis added by Justice Rehnquist).
"[Title VII] seeks to afford to all Americans equal opportunity in employment without dis-
crimination. Not equal pay. Not 'racial balance.' Only equal opportunity." Id at 248 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 12617 (1964)) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
274. Id at 248 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 12691 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Saltonstall)) (emphasis added by Justice Rehnquist).
275. Id at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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decision would open a floodgate of litigation by its undefined tolerance to re-
verse discrimination, an "evil," he said, that Congress sought to eliminate
through the enactment of Title VII.
276
. Balancing the Spirit and Letter to Uphold the Affirmative Action Concept
Weber's argument essentially was based on the equal treatment concep-
tion of equality with its emphasis on color-blindness and fairness to the indi-
vidual. Two underlying premises of this argument are that race-specific
remedies are inappropriate in the absence of a finding of unlawful discrimina-
tion and only identifiable victims of specific discrimination are entitled to
race-conscious relief. The arguments of defendants essentially were based on
the equal opportunity theory of equality with its emphasis on considerations of
color-consciousness and fairness to groups that have been historically disad-
vantaged by both specific and societal discrimination. Both sides could find
support in the employment discrimination cases decided by the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court adopted neither position totally. The Court rejected
Weber's argument that all race-conscious remedies are prohibited under Title
VII, or that those remedies could be imposed only upon a finding of unlawful
discrimination. The Court likewise rejected the defendants' argument that so-
cietal discrimination is an appropriate basis for adopting a race-conscious af-
firmative action plan, regardless of its impact on white employees. Having
rejected the invitation to adopt either position, the Court attempted to find a
middle ground on which to reconcile, if possible, the two theories of discrimi-
nation under Title VII.
The result in Weber turned fundamentally on a difference as to the theory
of legal analysis that should be used to address a difficult, but narrowly drawn,
statutory issue: Did Congress, in the enactment of Title VII, intend to forbid
private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide
affirmative-action plans that accord racial preferences in the manner and for
the purpose provided in the Kaiser plan?277 Implict in this narrowly drawn
question, however, are the two critical but interrelated questions that go to the
essence of the affirmative action principle: (1) Are race-conscious remedies
permissible under any circumstances absent a finding of past or continuing
discrimination?; and (2) Must the beneficiaries of race-conscious remedies
themselves be identifiable victims of specific (as opposed to societal) discrimi-
nation? The question, however framed, was troublesome and provocative
enough to place the Justices in the dilemma of having to address, either di-
rectly or indirectly, the issue of the competing theories of equality established
in Griggs and McDonnell Douglas.
All of the Justices seemed to agree that it was within the constitutional
authority of Congress to specifically sanction voluntary race-conscious affirm-
276. Id at 255 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
277. Id at 197.
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ative action plans.278 But, as Chief Justice Burger noted, whatever the wisdom
or morality of upholding the plan that Weber challenged, the courts were com-
pelled to disapprove it if Congress had unambiguously prohibited its adop-
tion.279 The problem for the Court, therefore, was to ascertain the intent of
Congress on the issue. The case thus posed a classic issue of statutory con-
struction in the context of a remedial civil rights statute.
The Justices disagreed on which of two approaches should be employed
as the method for determining legislative intent. Justice Rehnquist, writing for
himself and Chief Justice Burger, relied almost solely on the plain meaning
canon of statutory construction. He thus concluded that Congress, in passing
sections 703(a) and (d), meant that "no racial discrimination in employment is
permissible ... not even preferential treatment of minorities to correct racial
imbalance," 280 and that "Congress outlawed all racial discrimination, recog-
nizing that no discrimination based on race is benign, [and] that no action
disadvantaging a person because of his color is affirmative." 281 Thus, Justice
Rehnquist, even though recognizing that the "reality of employment discrimi-
nation against [blacks] provided the primary impetus for the passage of Title
VII,' '282 found no conflict between the theories of equality in Griggs and Mc-
Donald, the primary purpose for which Title VII was enacted, nor the statu-
tory language that Congress had chosen to carry out that purpose. Under
Rehnquist's analysis, any need to make an accommodation had been fore-
closed by the literal language of the Act, the clear legislative intent, and a
consistent line of cases extending back to Griggs.
The concept of equality that Justice Rehnquist adopted in Weber-equal
treatment-would obliterate the theoretical distinction between sections
703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2) that the Court had adopted in earlier cases. This con-
clusion flows from Justice Rehnquist's broad reading of the unanimous opin-
ion of the Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., which held
that the "uncontradicted legislative history . . . [of T]itle VII prohibits racial
discrimination against the white petitioners. . . upon the same standards as
278. Since the Kaiser-USWA plan does not involve state action, this case does not present
an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....
The only question before us is the narrow statutory issue of whether Title Vllforbids
private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative ac-
tion plans that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the purpose provided in
the Kaiser-USWA plan.
Id at 200 (Brennan, J.) (emphasis in original). "Quite simply, Kaiser's racially discriminatory
admission quota is flatly prohibited by the plain language of Title VII." Id at 228.
279. Id at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice noted that, were he a member of
Congress, he would have voted in favor of an amendment to Title VII permitting the Kaiser plan.
Id at 216 (Burger, C.J. dissenting). Justice Rehnquist made it clear, however, that he viewed
race-conscious remedies as an evil scarcely less dangerous than the initial racial discrimination
they were designed to rectify. Id at 254-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
280. 443 U.S. at 230 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
281. Id at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
282. "But this fact by no means supports the proposition the Congress intended to leave em-
ployers free to discriminate against white persons." Id at 229 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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would be applicable were they [blacks], '283 and from that part of Griggs in
which the Court observed that "discriminatory preference for any group, ma-
jority or minority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. '284
Under Rehnquist's analysis, Weber not only had established a prima facie
case under McDonald, he had established a conclusive case of discrimination,
because Justice Rehnquist failed to consider whether the justification offered
by defendants was sufficient to rebut Weber's case under the Griggs business
necessity doctrine or the McDonald legitimate nondiscriminatory reason ra-
tionale. If, as Justice Rehnquist believed, the "operative sections of Title VII
prohibit racial discrimination simpliciter [because it] prohibits a covered em-
ployer from considering race when making an employment decision, whether
he be black or white, '285 his reasoning would yield the same result had the
case been brought by a black employee of Kaiser. Under no set of circum-
stances would an employer be permitted to place even a "whisper of empha-
sis '28 6 on race. His rationale is broad enough to prohibit under Title VII, for
example, special recruitment efforts directed primarily at blacks, even on a
voluntary basis or even because of pressure from federal agencies.
In fact, the reading of McDonald that Justice Rehnquist adopted in
Weber would prohibit all preferential treatment of blacks over whites and
would thus eviscerate the heart of the affirmative action principle. 287 The is-
sue presented in McDonald, however, was only the sufficiency of a complain-
ant's allegation of preferential treatment benefitting a black. Defendants in
McDonald, unlike defendants in Weber, offered no justification for the alleged
racial preference and claimed that it was the result of a bona fide affirmative
action program.288 In a footnote, the Court explicitly denied that its opinion
expressed any view on the "permissibility of such a program, whether judi-
cially required or otherwise prompted." 289 Justice Rehnquist ignored this dis-
claimer, which he apparently viewed as inconsistent with the Court's
expansive language, and read the opinion broadly. This result is supportable
only if one accepts his premise that the statute is clear, unambiguous, and
leaves no doubt concerning the legislative intent. His opinion in General Elec-
283. Id at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 278 (1976)).
284. Id (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).
285. Id at 220 (Rebnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
286. Id at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
287. Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Weber would, in effect, substantially undercut the clear
implication that the use of race-conscious considerations in appropriate cases is permissible, an
implication that follows from Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), a case in
which he concurred. The Court approved differential validation of employment tests in Moody.
Id at 435. That procedure requires that an employer ensure that a test score of, for example, 50
for a black applicant means the same thing as a score of 50 for a nonminority applicant. See 29
C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(5) (1974) (no longer in force). By implication, were it determined that a test
score of 50 for a minority applicant corresponded in "potential employment" to a 60 for whites,
the test could not be used consistent with Title VII, unless the employer hired minorities with
scores of 50 even though he might not hire nonminority applicants with scores above 50 but below
60. Thus, it is clear that employers, to ensure equal opportunity, may have to adopt race-con-
scions hiring practices. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J.).
288. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281 n.8 (1976).
289. Id
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tric Co. v. Gilbert,290 however, virtually destroys this premise.
291
The "crux of the problem" in Weber, however, which the dissenters failed
to recognize, was that Congress failed to bridge the gap between equality as a
theoretical concept and equality as a reality for blacks. Congress, in the enact-
ment of Title VII, recognized that the principle beneficiaries of the legislation
were necessarily blacks and other minorities. Race-conscious consideration
was very much a part of the motivation that compelled Congress to enact Title
VII in the first instance, yet Congress chose language that could be interpreted
as embracing the color-blind theory of equality. The decisions of the Supreme
Court over the past decade tended to mirror the tension in the nation between
a color-blind and a color-conscious programatic approach to the race problem,
a problem that is still with us.292 The Supreme Court in Weber, therefore,
faced a choice of either allowing some race-conscious programs or perhaps
totally defeating the primary purpose of the Act. The majority opted for the
former, and rightfully so. Had the view of the dissenters prevailed, the ad-
verse impact on the enforcement of Title VII would have been so extensive
that new legislation would have been necessary. The reason for this is found
in the statement of Justice Blackmun "that additional considerations, practical
and equitable, only partially perceived, if perceived at all, by the 88th Con-
gress support the conclusion reached by the Court today."
293
The application of the plain meaning rule to sections 703(a), (d), and (j)
supports the dissenters' conclusion that Title VII was intended to prohibit all
forms of employment discrimination. The dissenters failed to recognize, how-
ever, that the application of the plain meaning rule, or strict construction of
statutory language, is not always appropriate 294 and that in many instances
some accommodation must be made between legislative intent and legislative
purpose, two concepts whose meanings are not always congruent.295 Because
290. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
291. See note 105 supra.
292. Compare, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) with McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). Recently Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court
in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1979), observed:
For we also cannot deny that 114 years after the close of the War Between the States and
nearly 100 years after Strauder, racial and other forms of discrimination still remain a
fact of life, in the administration ofjustice as in our society as a whole. Perhaps today
that discrimination takes a form more subtle than before. But it is not less real or perni-
cious.
See general, J. DREYFuss & C. LAWRENCE, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY
(1979).
293. 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
294. See Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule"and Statutory Interpreta-
lion in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLuM. L. Rav. 1299 (1975).
295. [L]aws are not abstract propositions. They are expressions of policy arising out of
specific situations and addressed to the attainment of particular ends. The difficulty is
that the legislative ideas which laws embody are both explicit and immanent. And so the
bottom problem is: What is below the surface of the words and yet fairly a part of them?
Words in a statute are not unlike words in a foreign language in that they too have
"associations, echoes, and overtones." Judges must retain the associations, hear the ech-
oes, and capture the overtones.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading o/Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947). See
R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 67-102 (1975). See also
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many statutes are enacted to cure social ills, some courts have been able to
effectuate both the intent and purpose of the enactment by emphasizing the
statutory language. At other times, however, it has been necessary for the
courts to look to the "spirit" of the statutes. At still other times it is necessary
for a court to strike a balance between the literal language and the spirit of a
statute.296 The majority in Weber took the latter approach.
The decision in Weber arguably was an attempt to make an accommoda-
tion between the competing theories of equality and the primary purpose of
Title VII. Justice Brennan recognized that the literal language of the Act and
the Court's decision in McDonald supported Weber's claim.297 He rejected
sole reliance on this line of reasoning, preferring instead to dispose of the case
under another canon of statutory construction: the "familiar rule that a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because
not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers. '298 This rule of
statutory construction, also known as the doctrine of equitable construction,299
has been employed by courts to expand or restrict the literal expression of a
statute when a literal interpretation would defeat the clear purpose of the act
or lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. 30° Many statutes enacted to
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,284-86 (1979) (although "purpose" of the law was to aid
veterans, the "intent" was to achieve that purpose by subordinating employment opportunities of
women) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-21 (1970).
296. See R. DICKERSON,supra note 295, at 213-16 (1975); 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 351-77 (4th ed. 1973).
297. 443 U.S. at 201 (Brennan, J.).
298. Id (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
299. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 296, at 351.
300. Legislative enactments now constitute a major part of the business of the federal courts.
One of the most fundamental, and most elusive, concepts in the interpretaton and application of
statutes is that of legislative intent. See, e.g., Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863
(1930). Conceived discrepancies between the "intention" of the legislative body and the "actual"
meaning of statutory language to effectuate that intent led to an early development of the doctrine
of equitable statutory construction, or what might be called construing a statute according to the
"spirit" of the act. See DeSloovere, The Equity andReason of a Statute, 21 CORNELL L. Rav. 591
(1935).
One of the ongoing disagreements in the case law and the legal lierature on statutory con-
struction is over the question of when a literal or "plain meaning" construction should be used
and when an equitable or "spirit" analysis should be used when the legislature does not address
the issue in specific terms. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 296, at 354-73; DeSloov6re, supra.
This disagreement is manifest in Weber, 443 U.S. at 201 (Brennan, J.); id at 254 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), and may shed some light on how Justices Powell and Stevens may have voted if they
had participated in Weber.
One of the more recent cases (other than Bakke) in which both Justices Powell and Stevens
participated, and the Holy Triniy doctrine of equitable construction, (Holy Trinity Church v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)), was at issue, is TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The issue in
Hill was whether the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976), required the
enjoining of a virtually completed federal dam in order to protect the snail darter. Chief Justice
Burger, who wrote the opinion of the Court, rejected the application of the Holy Trinit doctrine,
see text accompanying note 298 supra, because he found that the Court had applied it only "in
rare and exceptional circumstances" and even then "there must be something to make plain the
intent of Congress that the letter of the statute is not to prevail." 437 U.S. at 187 n.33 (quoting
Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)). Justice Powell dissented, finding that the Holv Trin.
ity doctrine was applicable and that the Chief Justice's reading of the cases applying this doctrine
was erroneous:
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serve the public welfare have been decided under this doctrine.
30
Justice Brennan found it necessary to balance a literal reading of sections
703(a) and (d) of Title VII against its "spirit" or primary purpose. Noting that
Congress sought "to open employment opportunities for [blacks] in occupa-
tions which have been traditionally closed to them, '30 2 he concluded that "[it
would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries
of racial injustice and intended to improve [their] lot," was construed to "con-
stitute the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious
efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierachy."
303
Justice Brennan turned to the legislative history to support his conclusion that
Title VII did not forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action. His
search was principally directed to this question: Given the available legisla-
tive history, has Congress unequivocally forbidden private employers and un-
ions from adopting affirmative action plans? His response was that given
congressional silence on the question and the absence of the phrase "require or
.permit" in section 7030), "the natural inference is that Congress chose not to
forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action."3 ° 4 He further sup-
ported this inference by noting that many members of the eighty-eighth Con-
gress had insisted that "'management prerogatives and union freedoms...
The Court suggests. . . that the precept stated in [Holy Trinity] was somehow under-
mined in [Crooks, supra]. Only a year after the decision in Crooks, however, the Court
declared that a "literal application of a statute which would lead to absurd consequences
is to be avoided whenever a reasonable application can be given which is consistent with
the legislative purpose." [United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931)]. In the fol-
lowing year, the Court expressly relied upan Church of Holy Trinity on this very point.
[Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 453, 446-448 (1932)].
Id at 204 n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Apparently, Chief Justice Burger did not believe that the question presented in Weber fell
within his reading of the Holy Trinity doctrine, notwithstanding a more recent case in which the
Court held that the doctrine "has particular application in the construction of labor legislation
which is 'to a marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise between strong contending
forces and deeply held views on the role of organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation
and the appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of management and
labor to further their respective interests.'" Woodwork Mfg. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967)
(quoting Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93, 99-100
(1958)).
Justice Powel's defense of the Holy Trinify doctrine in Hill suggests, by implication at least,
that he could have supported either the opinion of Justice Brennan of Justice Blackmun in Weber
since he recognized in Bakke that Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, had no
reason to consider the "validity of hypothetical preferences that might be accorded minority citi-
zens." 438 U.S. at 285 (Powell, J.). Moreover, the Holy Trinity "spirit" analysis would allow
Justice Powell to avoid a potentially troubling problem of the necessity of developing a theory
comparable to the "diversity" rationale on which he relied in Bakke as a basis on which he could
uphold voluntary race-conscious remedies in the employment discrimination context.
Justice Stevens joined in the Chief Justice's opinion in Hill and, presumably, in the reading of
Holy Trinity that the Chief Justice adopted. This reading of Holy Trinity and the "plain meaning"
analysis the Court adopted in Hill is, arguably, consistent with the position taken by Justice Ste-
vens in Bakke. If consistent, Justice Stevens would have difficulty in agreeing with either Justice
Brennan or Justice Powell in Weber.
301. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 296, at 361-62.
302. 443 U.S. at 203 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey)).
303. Id at 204 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
304. Id at 205-06 (emphasis in original).
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be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.' "305
The majority, like the dissenters, did not squarely face the question of the
conflicting notions of equality that the Court had read into Title VII. But
unlike Justice Rehnquist, the majority, in upholding defendants' affirmative
action plan, at least realized the necessity of making a choice. The majority,
for the first time, adopted a rationale that allows for an accommodation be-
tween the two views of equality. This conclusion is reached by framing the
question before the Court in a manner that it did not articulate: whether
Weber was entitled to relief under Title VII under the McDonnell Douglas
disparate treatment theory of discrimination when defendants have adopted a
bona fide race-conscious affirmative action plan? Clearly, Weber made out a
prima facie case under the four-part test ofMcDonnelDouglas.3° 6 The Court,
nevertheless, ruled against Weber, but neither Justice Brennan nor Justice
Blackmun expressly relied upon the two basic defenses to a prima facie case-
business necessity and legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.30 7 It then be-
comes necessary to ask why. The answer seems to lie, in part, on the Court's
willingness to realize that, arguably, a black plaintiff could have brought suit
against defendants and have established a prima facie case under either the
McDonnell Douglas or Griggs theories. 308 If both blacks and whites had sued
the defendants in separate lawsuits, how then should the court resolve the de-
fendant's dilemma? The answer of Weber appears to be that neither a black
plaintiff nor a white plaintiff is entitled to relief because Title VII does not
support a claim for discrimination when a defendant has adopted a voluntary
race-conscious affirmative action plan that is designed to eliminate manifest
racial imbalances, does not create an absolute bar to the advancement of other
members protected under Title VII, and is temporary in duration. This re-
sponse establishes a defense that does not fit neatly into either of the two most
widely recognized defenses to Title VII claims, but allows a defendant to rely,
in part at least, on societal discrimination as reflected in his workforce. The
emphasis on "manifest racial imbalances" preserves the Griggs theory, and the
emphasis on accommodating the advancement opportunities of white employ-
ees preserves the McDonnell Douglas theory. The emphasis on the temporary
duration of the plan preserves the vision that some day race will be as irrele-
vant in employer's decision-making process as is the color of one's eyes.
The opinion of Justice Brennan is perhaps more notable for the limita-
tions that it did not place on affirmative action rather than those that it did.
Although Justice Brennan did not speak directly to the question in Weber, his
305. Id at 206 (quoting H.R. REP. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2516).
306. See note 102 supra.
307. See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
308. Kaiser's other two plants in Louisiana had been the target of successful Title VII law
suits. Parsons v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 968 (1979); Burrell v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., Civ. Action 67-86 (M.D. La.)
(consent decree, Feb. 24, 1972). Cf Weber, 443 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (affirma-
tive action cases should be based on "arguable violation" theory of past employer discrimination
rather than an official finding of past discrimination). But see 443 U.S. at 209 n.9.
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analysis undergirds and supports two.important considerations for the contin-
ued vitality of the affirmative action principle. First, racial quotas are permis-
sible in appropriate circumstances to remedy specific and societal
discrimination without a judicial or administrative finding of discrimination.
Second, the beneficiaries of an affirmative action program need not be victims
of specific discrimination so long as it is reasonable to assume that they have
had a limitation placed on their employment opportunities as a result of socie-
tal discrimination.
Additionally, while Justice Brennan did not specifically define the outer
limits of affirmative action, the rationale of his decision clearly goes beyond
the facts of Kaiser's plan. The facts suggest that the defendants were caught
between conflicting theories of discrimination, dictates of federal agencies, and
employees claiming to be aggrieved by the presence or absence of some type of
affirmative action program. Less than two percent of the craft workers at the
Gramercy plant were blacks, and despite a thirty-nine percent black popula-
tion in the surrounding area Kaiser had had little success in recruiting exper-
ienced black workers.30 9 The obvious answer to Kaiser's problem was some
type of training program. If a strict seniority system had been followed, few
blacks would have been selected for the program, but the Steelworkers appar-
ently were unwilling to allow Kaiser to ignore seniority. As a result, the par-
ties compromised. Justice Brennan did not rely on these restricted facts in
reaching his result. His ruling, therefore, is broad enough to allow race-con-
scious affirmative actions not only when they are a reasonable response to
conflicting pressures, as in the Kaiser situation, but also in other circumstances
in which they constitute a reasonable response to the need to "break down old
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy."
Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, expressed preference for an "argua-
ble violation" theory rather than a "traditionally segregated" standard,310 but
he interpreted this standard in a manner making it essentially the same as the
standard adopted by Justice Brennan. Thus, for example, Justice Blackmun
held that a statistical disparity in employment ratios between blacks and
whites should be sufficient to satisfy the "arguable violation" standard,311 and
that an employer should be permitted, under this standard, to redress discrimi-
nation that took place before the enactment of Title VII.
312
Justice Blackmun reached a result similar to Justice Brennan for practical
rather than philosophical reasons. From a philosophical viewpoint, Justice
Blackmun would prefer to limit affirmative action to those situations in which
it is necessary for an employer to comply with the mandate suggested by
Griggs, either to validate a selection procedure or to correct any statistical
309. 443 U.S. at 198-99.
310. Id at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
311. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring).
312. "Strong considerations of equity support an interpretation of Title VII that would permit
private affirmative action to reach where Title VII itself does not." Id at 214 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
imbalance in the impact of the selection procedure. 313 He recognized, how-
ever, that to require a finding of discrimination before implementing affirma-
tive action would place an intolerable burden on the courts, private parties,
and enforcement agencies.314 He was inclined also to enunciate a more re-
strictive standard than Justice Brennan, but he recognized that to do so would
put the employer in the position of having to expose himself to potential liabil-
ity. Thus, it seems that Justice Blackmun watered down his standard, making
it almost indistinguishable from that of Justice Brennan.
It would be fruitless to argue that Congress was unconcerned with elimi-
nating the use of race as an explicit employment criterion. The Court recog-
nized in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail that congressional concern for
discrimination in employment properly extended to whites as well as to blacks
and other racial minorities. It would be equally disingenuous, however, to
suggest that Congress' concern was limited to the neutral "nondiscriminatory"
principle of equal treatment-that is, the view that Title VII is concerned with
no more and no less than the explicit use of race, and that Title VII was not
specially concerned with the employment problems of blacks. Indeed, it is
probable that in the absence of the historical mistreatment of blacks, Congress
would not have perceived a need for Title VII or similar civil rights statutes at
all. These laws are, in effect, a recognition that the ordinary interplay of pri-
vate forces is simply inadequate to undo the patterns of discrimination created
by centuries of unequal treatment. The Court recognized this in Griggs when
it noted that the plain objective of Title VII was to (a) achieve equality of
employment opportunity and (b) to remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over black employ-
ees.
315
Recognition of these dual concerns--"nondiscrimination" plus a special
concern for blacks and other minorities-is supported by the judicial as well as
the legislative history of Title VII. Initially, most of the Title VII litigation
focused upon instances in which racial animus stood behind the denial of em-
ployment benefits to blacks.316 The early cases seemed to require that a Title
VII plaintiff demonstrate that the employer's conduct was racially moti-
vated.
3 17
This early Title VII history thus reflected the equal treatment theory-
situations involving racial animus were merely the starkest examples of the
behavior that the equal treatment theory prohibits. However, as courts, en-
forcement agencies, and others gained experience under Title VII, it became
overwhelmingly clear that confining the application of the statute to a neutral
313. Id at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
314. Id at 209-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
315. 401 U.S. at 429-30 (1971).
316. See, e.g., Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603, 609 (E.D. La. 1969), afldon
other grounds, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. H.K. Porter, 296 F. Supp. 40, 107
(N.D. Ala. 1968); Gunn v. Layne & Bowler Co., 1 Empl. Proc. Dec. 9823 (E.D. Tenn. 1967);
Belton, supra note 90, at 935.
317. See, eg., M. SOvERN, supra note 30, at 70-73.
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nondiscriminatory standard would fail to achieve meaningful employment op-
portunities for blacks. As Chief Justice Burger noted in Griggs, a broader
reading was required in order that Title VII "not provide equality of opportu-
nity merely in the sense of the fabeled offer of milk to the stork and fox."
'318
As it became painfully obvious that our nation's race problem was tracea-
ble to a complex set of conditions and to actions and inactions of numerous
individuals and institutions, it likewise became clear that Title VII would be-
come "mellifluous but hollow rhetoric ' 3 19 if those individuals and institutions
could each place blame on the other and not take steps to deal with the prob-
lem.320 In short, to require a black Title VII plaintiff to pin his deprivation of
employment benefits squarely on the misbehavior of others would have mate-
rially frustrated congressional purposes.
These concerns lay behind the line of cases beginning with, and perhaps
more clearly exemplified by Griggs. These cases imported into Title VII law a
number of mechanisms that nudged open the judicial door so that the statute
might achieve its primary purpose. These mechanisms included, among
others, the disparate impact analysis and related statistical presumptions,
rather than proof of intent. Devices such as the disparate impact analysis did
not relieve black plaintiffs from having to establish that the defendant had
unlawfully discriminated. They did, however, substantially broaden the
meaning of "unlawful employment discrimination" in order that Title VII
might at least begin to reduce the racial disparaties that so concerned Con-
gress.
IV. CONCLUSION
The aspiration of the American people is for a color-blind society, one
that neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. But color-conscious-
ness is unavoidable while the effects of decades of governmentally and pri-
vately imposed racial wrongs persist. The concept of affirmative action has
arisen from that inescapeable conclusion. A society that forecloses racially-
conscious remedies would not be color-blind, but morally blind. The justifica-
tion for affirmative action to secure equal access to the job market lies in the
need to overcome the effects of past discrimination by the employers, unions,
colleges, and universities asked to undertake that action. It rests also in the
practical need to assure that citizens whose lives have been marked by dis-
crimination, overt as well as subtle, are not forever barred from the opportu-
nity to realize their potential and become useful and productive citizens. The
test of affirmative action programs is, as Weber suggests, whether they are well
calculated to achieve these objectives and whether they can do so in a way that
deals fairly with the rights and competing interests of all citizens. While care
must be taken to safeguard against abuses, affirmative action, as applied in a
318. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
319. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1238 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
320. See Black, Economic Downturn, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 559.
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variety of contexts, including those in which numerically based race-conscious
remedies have been employed, can meet this fundamental standard.
Affirmative action programs have been in effect, in most instances, for less
than a decade, an eye-blink in history compared to the centuries of discrimina-
tion that preceeded them. The gains secured thus far have been modest and
fragile. Yet it is contended, under the banner of reverse discrimination, that
the civil rights laws of the 1960's and the gains that go to some individuals
render affirmative action a new kind of special favortism. In this challenge,
there are echoes of a Supreme Court decision almost a century old:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken up the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some state in the progress of his evolution when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen and ceases to be a special favorite of
the laws. 3
21
The 1883 Supreme Court decision that the "state of progress" had been
reached signaled the end of efforts to deal with the consequences of slavery and
helped usher in an era of enforced segregation and discrimination that has
persisted throughout this century.
A ruling in favor of Weber would have carried a message into the 1980's
that this nation, for a second time, had reached a "state of progress" sufficient
to justify the abandonment of the most significant component of affirmative
action programs. This message, like the one in 1883, would have disastrous
consequences. Such a decision could only be reached by ignoring the crushing
burden of unemployment, poverty, and discrimination facing black people
and other minorities. The abandonment of affirmative action programs, of
which numerical goals are an integral part, would shut out many thousand
minority workers from opportunities that have only recently become available
to them.
321. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 61 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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